University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 18
1985

From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of
Noncoital Reproduction
Joan Heifetz Hollinger
University of Detroit Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joan H. Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction,
18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 865 (1985).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol18/iss4/5

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

FROM COITUS TO COMMERCE:
LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOITAL
REPRODUCTION
Joan Heifetz Hollinger*

I.
II.
III.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Baby-Making Market: Improving Technology,
Insistent Psychology and Increasing Demand . . . .
Regulation of the Baby-Making Market: A Framework for Needed Protections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Facilitating Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Facilitating informed and voluntary decisions.................................
2. Facilitating implementation of decisions .
3. Supporting reasonable expectations . . . . .
a. Of participants in IVF, ET, and AID
i.
Establishing the legal status of
offspring and parents . . . . . . . . .
11.
Establishing freedom from unnecessary physical or emotional
complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Of parties to surrogacy contracts . . .
i.
Specifying the interests of the
parties .............. ·. . . . . . . .
11.
The indeterminacy of prevailing
contract and family law principles.........................
m. Justifying a presumption for enforcing surrogacy contracts . . . .
B. Minimizing Harm, Especially to the Children
1. Threats to physical well-being. . . . . . . . . .
2. Threats to psychological well-being . . . . .

866
870
882
882
882
886
895
896
896
899
901
902
904
909
914
914
916

* Lecturer, Stanford Law School, 1984-85; Associate Professor of Law, University of
Detroit Law School. B.A., 1961, Swarthmore College; M.A., 1963, University of California
at Berkeley; J.D., 1974, S.U.N.Y. Buffalo.
This paper owes much to discussions during 1984-85 with several colleagues, including
Michael Wald and Robert Mnookin of the Stanford Law School and Emmet Lamb,
Merton Bernfield, and Ernie Young of the Stanford Medical School.

865

Journal of Law Reform

866

a.
b.

IV.

[VOL. 18:4

Whether to reveal the child's origins
Whether to reveal non-identifying
information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Whether to reveal the identity of
IVF, ET, and AID donors . . . . . . . . .
d. Whether to reveal the identity of
surrogate gestators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. A different kind of harm to children . . . .
Conclusion: Improving the Quality of Research
and Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

917
919
920
924
926
928

INTRODUCTION

History's most famous infertile couple resorted to a surrogate
mother. Many years before Abraham and Sarah were blessed
with Isaac, the natural son of their old age, the "barren" Sarah
had said to her frustrated husband: Abraham, take my slave girl
Hagar and through her, I, Sarah, will have a family with you. 1
Then, as now, it was not so simple. Shortly after the surrogate
mother Hagar became pregnant (through coital means, of
course), she began to assert her superiority over Sarah. Is it possible to anticipate, and hence, mitigate the personal and psychological rivalry between a genetic and gestational mother and an
intended rearing mother? The understanding that Sarah had
reached with Abraham and Hagar could not be sustained. Sarah
mistreated Hagar and Ishmael, the son Hagar bore for Abraham,
and eventually drove them into the wilderness. Ishmael took
with him a formidable curse: "He shall be a man like the wild
ass ... at odds with all his kinsmen," the Angel of the Lord
told his mother. 2 Abraham's name and property would descend
exclusively through the biological offspring of himself and his
wife Sarah and not through Ishmael, his bastard son. Hagar's
compensation was God's assurance that Ishmael, although cut
off from Abraham's lineage, would become the father of a separate nation.
The Biblical cast of characters found surrogacy a problematic
course, even with the benefit of the Lord's guidance. Today's
participants in the various scenarios for "assisting" human reproduction and creating new family relationships face their
share of problems too, but with what guidance? Our society is
1.
2.

Genesis, 16-17.
Id.
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uncertain about how to respond to the legal, ethical, and
psychosocial consequences of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo storage and transfer, and hired baby-bearers. 3
In relying on our technological capacity to separate the genetic
from the gestational aspects of reproduction• and in paying for
the use of a third person's sperm, ova, embryos, or womb in order to produce a "child of their own," should involuntarily childless couples 11 be left, as it were, to their own devices?
At present, there are no federal 6 or state laws7 that prohibit
research on or the use of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfers to relieve infertility. Nor do any federal or state laws directly encourage or provide funds for such research or treat3. Hereinafter, artificial insemination will be referred to as AID, in vitro fertilization
as IVF, embryo transfer as ET, and hired baby-bearers as surrogate gestators or uterine
hostesses.
4. It is already possible for a child to have five different "parents": the woman who
donated the egg, the man who donated the sperm, the woman to whose womb the fertilized embryo is transferred so she can carry it to birth, and the man and woman who will
receive and presumably raise the infant. Andrews, The Stork Market, 6 WHI'ITIER L.
REV. 789, 791 (1984).
5. The "involuntarily childless" characterization comes from Leon Kass and is in my
view preferable to the words "infertile" or "sterile." It does not carry the potential
stigma of "barrenness" implicit in those words and it is a broader and more accurate
characterization of idiopathic or medically inexplicable kinds of infertility as well as of
clinically diagnosed kinds. See Kass, "Making Babies" Revisited, 54 Pus. INTEREST 32
(1979). I will, however, for the sak·e of economy of language, use the word infertile more
often than "involuntarily childless" to describe the persons most likely to resort to the
new reproductive technology.
6. Although in 1979, the Report of the Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) concluded that, under certain circumstances, it would be appropriate for the federal government to support IVF research, it
did not make any specific recommendation that the National Institute of Health (NIH)
provide funds for such research. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EAB REP.] The EAB was terminated in 1980, and since then, neither
HEW's successor, the Department of Health and Human Services, nor NIH has shown
any interest in pushing for federal support for IVF or ET research. The best account of
the political and other reasons for the persistent lack of federal involvement is
Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.
1984, at 5. The Reagan Administration is decidedly opposed to IVF or ET research. This
prompted the chief of pregnancy research at NIH to resign in protest of what he called
the government's failure to fulfill its responsibilities to infertile couples and "generations
of unborn." The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46, 53.
7. Although many states have statutes restricting fetal research, these have generally
been construed as not restricting IVF or ET research or procedures because they occur
prior to implantation of a fertilized ovum in a woman's uterus and, therefore, prior to
the creation of a fetus. A concise overview of these statutes is in Quigley & Andrews,
Human In Vitro Fertilization and the Law, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 348 (1984). In
contrast to the ambiguous definitions of "fetus" that are used in some of the state statutes, the federal guidelines for fetal research are more precise. A fetus is defined as "the
product of conception from the time of implantation," 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1984).
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ment. 8 The situation with regard to surrogate gestators is more
ambiguous. Although state laws aimed against "baby-selling" arguably prohibit surrogacy contracts,9 there are also well-established traditions of greater informality in the handling of stepparent adoptions than of adoptions between strangers, 10 and
courts routinely enforce, indeed encourage, private agreements
between biological parents concerning the custody and support
of their children. 11 Therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude
that the apparent lack of a regulatory framework means that decisions about noncoital means of reproduction are being made
"autonomously," unseen and untouched by the law. Uncertainties about the legal consequences of procreative choices may unreasonably burden their exercise and in some instances may preclude altogether the making of choices subsequently believed to
be vital to the well-being of parents or their children. 12
This paper argues that there is an urgent need for the creation
and clarification of a legal framework within which contemporary efforts to produce or procure children can take place. State
legislatures should act now in order to avoid the kind of crisis
that confronts Great Britain, where an infant girl, the product of
a breached surrogacy contract, has been impounded by a British
8. Whatever research is currently being done to improve IVF and ET techniques, l.llld
to learn more about their physiological consequences, is supported entirely by private
funds, including some portion of the fees paid by patients.
9. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1984) provides that "a person
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in
connection with [an adoption or a release of parental rights]"; CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)
(Deering 1971) makes it a misdemeanor to offer any payments or anything of value to a
parent in order to procure a consent to an adoptive placement and CAL. PENAL CoDE §
181 (Deering 1971) makes it a felony to pay money or anything of value in order to have
a child placed in another person's custody. Although half or more of the states have
similar statutes, their scope is unclear and their enforcement irregular. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273(a) goes on to provide, for example, that it is not unlawful "to pay the maternityconnected medical or hospital and necessary living expenses of the mother . . . as an act
of charity, as long as the payment is not contingent upon" the completion of the adoption. See generally, W. MEEzAN, S. KATZ & E.M. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES
149-210 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MEEZAN].
10. Many of these statutes are cited in MEEZAN, supra note 9, at 149-210. Most states
dispense with the requirement of a social investigation of the adoptive parent when he or
she is the child's stepparent.
11. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
12. For example, the absence of legal requirements to obtain and retain accurate genealogical and medical records for sperm, ova, embryo or baby-donors may make it impossible to disclose this information to the offspring of noncoital reproduction when they
reach 18 even though such disclosure may, by then, be considered desirable. Such difficulties are already being encountered by AID offspring who are seeking information
about their genetic fathers. See infra text accompanying notes 202-18.
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court. 13 While the court ponders how to determine the legal parentage of this particular child, Parliament considers criminal
penalties for those who arrange surrogacy contracts and general
regulations to constrain IVF and ET research and practice. 14
The elements of the framework I propose derive from ·a principle
of "supportive neutrality" similar to that set forth by David
Chambers in a companion article in this Symposium. 111 The federal and state governments should encourage the procreative efforts of childless couples and remain neutral among couples
making different choices. This neutrality implies a presumptive
deference to voluntary private agreements and a reluctance to
dictate their terms.
The elements of my proposed framework also derive from a
commitment to minimizing the risks of specific physical and
psychological harms to the children generated by noncoital reproduction, as well as to all the other participants. 16 Finally,
these elements respond to my own belief that the opportunity to
raise a child-the rearing aspects of parenting-hold much
greater significance for both adults and children than do the genetic or gestational links between a child and her parents. This
is not to suggest that children raised by adults to whom they are
not biologically related should be cut off from knowledge of, or
even contact with, their biological kindred. 17 But I would search
for ways to make adoption both more feasible and more attrac13. An account of how this infant became a temporary ward of a British court is in
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1.
14. A series of recommendations to criminalize surrogacy and to closely monitor and
control !VF and ET in Britain are included in DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND Soc1AL SECURITY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY
(HMSO 1984) [hereinafter cited as WARNOCK REP.]. The use of noncoital methods of
reproduction has recently caught other legal systems by surprise. In Australia, the furor
provoked when the intended parents of a frozen embryo died without having made any
provisions for the disposition of the embryo was so intense that the Victoria government
asked a special commission to consider a wide range of issues posed by the technological
capacity to freeze embryos, COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION [WALLER COMM'N], REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (Aug. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
WALLER REP.]. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at Al8. In France, a court proceeding
became necessary to determine whether a widow had a right to be inseminated with the
frozen sperm of her deceased husband, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1984, at 20.
15. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive
Neutrality, 18 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 805 (1985).
16. My framework consists of elements that are similar to those stated by Grace
Blumberg in her discussion of donor embryo transfer: "The optimal legal response is
precisely tailored legislation that will give due weight to process integrity, the interests of
the child and the reasonable expectations of the parties." Blumberg, Legal Issues in
Nonsurgical Human Ovum Transfer, 251 J.A.M.A. 1178, 1180 (1984).
17. See discussion infra, notes 194-219 and accompanying text.
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tive than it now is. Adoption should remain a prominent route
by which adults can become parents and children can be assured
of having parents. Before testing the elements of this framework
on some of the problems presented by the new reproductive
methods, I will say something about the nature of the present
baby-making market, assess who stands to gain or lose by its
operation, and indicate why any legal efforts to prohibit this
market from operating would be unwise, whether or not
unconstitutional.

II.

THE BABY-MAKING MARKET: IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY,
INSISTENT PSYCHOLOGY AND INCREASING DEMAND

Baby-making by noncoital means has become a booming business. Since 1978, when the first live birth from IVF was achieved
in Great Britain, 18 at least 1,000 babies have been born throughout the world as a consequence of in vitro fertilization or embryo
transfer techniques. 19 In the United States, estimates run as
high as 200-300 such babies. The first IVF clinic opened in this
country at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1978 and reported its first live
birth in December, 1981. 20 As many as 150-200 such clinics may
now be in operation around the country. About fifty of these are
affiliated with universities or other major medical centers; the
others are being set up as adjuncts to the private practices of
obstetricians and gynecologists. 21 Augmenting the sudden rash
of IVF clinics are a rapidly growing number of private organizations, typically run by lawyers or lawyer-doctor teams, that are
in the business of negotiating and arranging for the performance
of contracts between childless couples and surrogate gestators. It
is anyone's guess how many babies are being produced in this
18. An announcement of the birth of Louise Brown and brief accounts of the work of
British Doctors Steptoe and Edwards are in NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66; TIME, July
31, 1978, at 58; N.Y. Times, July 26, 1978, at Al, col. 5.
19. One thousand may be too high; some think it is only 500-600. Abramowitz, supra
note 6.
20. Jones, The Program for In Vitro Fertilization at Norfolk, 38 FERTILITY & STERIL·
ITV 14 (1982).
21. Kolata, In Vitro Fertilization Goes Commercial, 221 Sci. 1160 (1983). According
to the more conservative estimates of the American Fertility Society, fewer than fifty
IVF centers have opened. Abramowitz, supra note 6. For an account of IVF services
being offered by two doctors who share a private practice, see Sher, Knutzen, Stratton,
Montalhab, Allenson, Mayville, Rubenstein, Glass & Bilach, The Development of a Successful Non-University Based Ambulatory In Vitro Fertilization/Embryo Transfer Program: Phase I, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY, 511 (1984).
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country through surrogacy arrangements. 22 Alongside this
proliferati on of treatments and services for overcoming female
infertility, a robust market operates for old-fashioned artificial
insemination of the wife of a sterile man with the purchased
sperm of an anonymous donor (AID). 23 Estimates of the numbers of children who are born each year as a result of AID vary
from 6,000 to 20,000. 24
For those couples who seek to benefit from the new reproductive techniques, the financial costs are high. The current market
cost for IVF is $4,000-5,000 for each attempt at implantation in
a woman's uterus of an eight to sixteen cell blastocyst fertilized
in a petri dish from her surgically-removed ovum and the manually-expressed sperm of her husband or some other donor. 26 If
the initial attempt fails to result in a viable pregnancy, as is
most likely, subsequent attempts are less expensive, particularly
if an "excess" supply of eggs has been removed during the initial
surgical procedure, or laparoscopy, then fertilized and frozen for
22. The surrogate parenting organizations that have received the most. publicity are
in Kentucky, New York, and California. No public authority has licensed any of them.
To date, the only organization to be specifically enjoined from continuing its work is
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. (SPA) of Kentucky. In reversing a Circuit Court
opinion permitting SPA to arrange surrogacy contracts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that SPA's activities violated Kv. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2) providing that no person
or agency not licensed by the state may accept remuneration for the procurement of any
child for adoption. Kentucky v. SPA, Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1105 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
1983). The New York surrogacy organization opened by Michigan attorney Noel Keane
is described in Brozan, Surrogate Mothers: Problems and Goals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,
1984 at A17. A thriving surrogacy practice in California is described in Handel, Surrogate Parenting, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transplantation, 6 WHITTIER L. REV.
783 (1984). Needless to say, there is no central registry listing either the number of surrogacy contracts entered into or those that have been fully performed.
23. Artificial insemination using the sperm of a male donor has been an accepted
medical treatment for nearly fifty years, w. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (2d ed.
1976); Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV.
465, 468 (1983).
24. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of AID in the U.S., 300 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Curie-Cohen]. This study estimated that
there were fewer than 10,000 AID children born annually; other estimates run as high as
20,000. Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1984, at 1. The inadequacy of the records kept by physicians
who perform AID is one reason for the wide disparity in estimates of precisely how many
children are conceived each year through AID.
25. The data in this and the following paragraphs is based on discussions with Dr.
Emmet Lamb, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology and Director of the proposed IVF
program at the Stanford Medical School and with Dr. Merton Bernfield, Professor of
Pediatrics at the Stanford University Medical School (Oct. 8, 1984, Nov. 12, 1984, and
Jan. 14, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Lamb discussions]. A good introduction to the medical technology is in Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, External Human Fertilization: An
Evaluation of Policy, 222 Sc1. 127 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Grobstein]. More technical
discussions appear nearly every month in the professional journal, FERTILITY &
STERILITY.
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later implantation. 26 These estimates do not take into account
the additional expenses incurred by such repeated efforts to
achieve pregnancy and carry a baby to term, including travel,
lodging, and loss of earnings. Couples typically can expect to pay
around $12,000-15,000 for medical expenses alone for a less than
fifty percent chance that the wife will become pregnant and an
even lower chance that she will give birth. 27 When other expenses are added, the average cost for a couple who end up with
a healthy baby can approach $40,000-50,000. The costs can be as
high for those who end up with no child.
Somewhat less costly than in vitro fertilization are donor embryo transfers. These involve the in vivo fertilization of an ovum
donor by artificial insemination with the intended father's
sperm, the non-surgical removal from the donor of the fertilized
ovum before she becomes technically pregnant, 28 and the nonsurgical transfer of the donated embryo to the uterus of the intended mother, who will then presumably gestate the embryo
and carry it to term. This process is described by one of its pioneers as an effort to "qualify humans as the fifteenth mammalian species in which embryo transfer is expected to produce
normal young." 29 To date, human embryo transfer has been
tried in this country only at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center and
has resulted in substantially lower rates of pregnancy and birth30
than the comparable success rates from in vitro fertilization. 31
26. A good overview of recent advances in the freezing of embryos and the advantages of this procedure for reducing the number of surgical laparoscopies a woman must
undergo during IVF is Coulam, Freezing Embryos, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 184 (1984).
27. Kolata, supra note 21, at 1160.
28. Medically, a woman is not considered pregnant until a fertilized embryo has become implanted in her uterus. This does not occur until three to five days after the
woman's ovum has been inseminated within her reproductive system. Cf. definition of
"fetus" used in federal guidelines for fetal research, supra note 7. The embryo is removed from the donor by a process called "lavage," which is literally a flushing-out,
performed with a specially designed catheter.
29. Interview with Dr. John Buster of Harbor-UCLA Medical Center (Feb. 21, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Buster interview]. See also Brotman, Human Embryo Transplants,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 6 (Magazine) at 42, 47.
30. Bustillo, Buster, Cohen, Thorneycroft, Simon, Boyers, Marshall, Seed, Louw &
Seed, Nonsurgical Ovum Transfer as a Treatment in Infertile Women, 251 J.A.M.A.
1171 (Mar. 2, 1984). The physicians reported a pregnancy rate of six percent of all attempts (two continuing pregnancies from 29 attempts) at in vivo fertilization by artificial
insemination of an ovum donor. Measured as a percentage of completed embryo transfers from the ovum donor to the intended uterine mother, a rate of 16% was achieved
(two pregnancies from 12 transfers). Some commentators have questioned whether the
procedures described by the UCLA physicians as an acceptable "treatment" for infertility should, instead, still be regarded as highly experimental. See Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of Parenting, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 25.
31. Most IVF clinics still do not report pregnancy rates of higher than 20% of all
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For full surrogacy, in which a woman agrees to serve as agestational hostess for a child whose intended rearing parents are
the genetic father and his infertile wife, estimated costs are
$10,000-30,000 or higher, depending on whether legal fees as well
as payments to the baby's uterine hostess are included. 32 Compared to these techniques for alleviating female infertility, the
cost for providing an infertile man an opportunity to be the legal
parent of a child borne by his wife after she has been artificially
inseminated with the sperm of a third party donor is only onetenth to one-hundredth as much.
High financial costs in exchange for low birth rates have· not
deterred childless couples from seeking IVF or ET treatment,
nor from pursuing the medically simpler but legally more complex surrogate gestator arrangements. Waiting lists for all these
services are filled and, absent an unanticipated medical catastrophe or a systematic attempt at prohibition, the demand is likely
to increase substantially in coming years. Americans may be experiencing a veritable epidemic of infertility. An estimated ten
to fifteen percent of all married couples are involuntarily childless: they fail to conceive after trying to do so for at least a year
of not using contraceptives. 33 This represents a threefold inimplantation attempts. Wallis, A Surrogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984 at 150. There
are reports of pregnancy rates of 30% or higher per patient, Jones, Acosta, Andrews,
Garcia, Seegar, Jones, Mayer, McDowell, Rozennaks, Sandon, Veek & Wilkes, Three
Years of !VF at Norfolk, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 826 (1984). Because there are no
federal or state reporting requirements, nor any standardized method for reporting the
results of IVF or ET treatment, it is extremely difficult to get accurate data on just how
many babies are being born as a percentage of implantation attempts or as a percentage
of pregnancies. This in turn makes it extremely difficult to assess the overall costs or the
costs per patient. There is little doubt, however, that IVF and ET pregnancy rates are
still only about 40% that of pregnancy rates achieved through the "natural" or unassisted reproductive process. See Grobstein, supra note 25.
32. N. KEANE & D. BREo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 17 (1981); Wallis, supra note 31,
at 53. There are no accurate assessments of the fees being paid to surrogate gestators or
to the lawyers who arrange surrogacy contracts. Some people offer as much as $50,000 for
surrogacy services. See, e.g., the classified advertisement for a "tall, trim, intelligent, and
stable" surrogate aged 22-35 who, in addition to a payment of $50,000, is offered the
assurance that her child "will be reared in an outstanding environment," N. Y. REv. OF
BooKs, July 18, 1985, at 51.
33. NAT'L. CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., VITAL & HEALTH STATS., SER. 23, No. 11, at 13-16,
32 (Dec. 1982). There do not seem to be comparable statistics for unmarried women. But
see the account of the increase in the past few years of sterility among married and
unmarried women caused by sexually transmitted diseases. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at
72-73. New data from the National Center for Health Statistics on the widespread incidence of serious impediments to conception among all women of childbearing age (15-44)
are reported in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1985, at A12, col. 3. For an account of the
incidence of male infertility, see Brody, Infertility: Not Uncommon Male Problem, but
Often Treatable, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1985, at C21, col. 3.
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crease over childlessness rates reported twenty years ago. 34 In
more than half of the present cases, the difficulties are attributable to the women. As many as forty to fifty percent of these
women are unable to conceive because they have blocked, diseased, or otherwise damaged oviducts. 35 Perhaps an additional
ten percent are women who have had their fallopian tubes tied
as a contraceptive measure, but who now want to become pregnant. 36 Surgical efforts to repair damaged oviducts or to reverse
tubal ligations are costly, unpleasant, and only moderately successful.37 There are, then, 500,000 to 1,000,000 married women
who are unable to .have a child related to them, genetically or
gestationally, without some kind of assisted fertilization or uterine implantation. For women whose reproductive systems are intact but who are potential transmitters of genetic diseases, IVF
is not appropriate, but donor embryo transfer might be. 38 For
women who have had hysterectomies, neither IVF nor ET is
medically feasible. Resort to a surrogate gestator may be the
only way for these women to raise a child who is genetically related to their spouses, although not to them. For couples whose
infertility is attributable to the husband, the most efficacious
noncoital reproductive techniques are traditional AID of the
.wife and IVF.
These data on the prevalence of involuntary childlessness and
on the suitability of different methods for specific physical conditions do not by themselves account for the growing demand
for access to the baby-making market. Much of this demand follows from the social and psychological importance people attach
to the ideal of having children who are genetically theirs. At present, many perceive adoption as impracticable or "undesirable,"39 a decided second best to having genetically-related offspring. In our culture, the desire to reproduce through blood
lines, to connect to future generations through one's genes, continues to exert a powerful and pervasive influence. Evidence
34. Reproductive endocrinologist Martin Quigley, quoted in TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at
50.
35. Bigger, In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Embryo Transfer in Humans,
in EAB REP., supra note 6, Appendix, § 8 at 2.
36. Sterilization is now the most popular form of contraception, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11,
1985, at A12, col. 3. Research on women who later regret their original decision to be
sterilized is summarized in Huggins & Sondheimer, Complications of Female Sterilization: Immediate and Delayed, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 337 (Mar. 1984).
37. Lauritsen, Pagel, Vangsted, Starnp, Results of Repeated Tuboplasties, 37 FER•
TILITY & STERILITY 68 (1982); Lamb discussions, supra note 25.
38. Jones, Variations of a Theme, 250 J.A.M.A. 2182 (1983).
39. "Undesirable" translates as "not enough healthy white newborns." See discussion
infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
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from other societies and from sub-cultures within America suggests that this desire is not "innate" nor biologically determined,
but is culturally constructed.• 0 The cultural origins and reinforcement of this desire do not minimize its importance, nor the
reality of the distress infertile men and women experience by
being excluded from a range of fulfilling human activities associated with childbearing and childrearing.4 1 Women especially
have been socialized with the view that their self-esteem, their
deepest sense of personhood, depends on their ability to bear a
child. 42
The development of IVF and ET and the interest in surrogate
gestation would seem, then, to herald a new chapter in the story
of the striving of men and women, but especially of women, to
gain full procreative autonomy. Previous chapters in this story
recount how the improvement of birth control techniques, the
removal of legal restrictions on their use, and the recognition of
a constitutional right to abortion enabled men and women to
prevent conception, and women to terminate unwanted
pregnancies. 43 The new chapter will detail efforts to achieve
freedom to conceive despite what may be an unprecedented
range of impediments. This tale contains several ironies,
however.
First, the dramatic increase of female infertility in recent
years is in part the unfortunate concomitant of the hard won
freedom to prevent conception. Pelvic inflammatory disease,
blocked oviducts, uterine and cervical cancer, or ectopic
pregnancies have turned out to be the devastating consequences
for many women of certain birth control devices, including the
Dalkon Shield and the pill. 44 Second, the casual and diverse sex40. See, e.g., Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 539 (1983-84).
41. A compassionate analysis of the nature of the procreative desire is in Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REV. 405, 408-10 (1983). See also the discussion in WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, at ch. 2,
§§ 2.1-2.4.
42. An excellent overview of contemporary feminist writing, including the analyses of
Michelle Rosaldo, Sherry Ortner and others of how women have been socialized into the
cult of domesticity and childbearing, is H. EISENSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1983). See also WOMEN, CULTURE & Soc1ETY (1974).
43. Perhaps the best accounts of nineteenth and early twentieth century efforts to
achieve freedom from conception are L. GORDON, WoMEN's BODY, WOMEN'S RIGHT (1976);
D. KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1970); J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978);
and J. REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE To PuBLIC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH CoNTROL MOVEMENT AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1830 (1978).
44. Lamb discussions, supra note 25; Stevenson, Fund is Created to Settle Claims on
Birth Devices, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
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ual relationships facilitated by the ability to control conception
have contributed to the extraordinary increase in the incidence
of sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Many of these cause sterility if not treated in their early stages; others may not even be
treatable. Although the frightening spread of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) indicates that men are not being
spared the ravages of these infections, the most severe damage
to reproductive capacities from STDs, especially chlamydia, gonorrhea, and genital herpes, is being visited upon women. 45 Third,
by postponing childbearing until they have established a career
for themselves, many women are discovering that it is more difficult to become pregnant as they approach forty and that there is
a somewhat greater risk of giving birth to a child with Down's
syndrome. By not having given birth when they were younger,
they may also have made themselves more vulnerable to endometriosis or to some other condition that threatens their ability to conceive. 46 Having successfully separated sex from gestation, more and more people, especially women, now find that
they cannot gestate with sex.
Of course, the "new" impediments to conception are due to
more than the advent of birth control or the proliferation of different lifestyles. Environmental pollutants and other by-products of our technological age have done their part to render people infertile and to increase the risk of birth defects. Similarly,
drugs such as diethyl stilbestrol (DES), once believed to reduce
the risk of miscarriage for pregnant women, may have impaired
the ability of many of these women's daughters to successfully
bear children. 47 Hence the drive to make use of the new reproductive technologies derives not simply from the fact of infertility, nor from its apparent increase, but from the social and medical circumstances under which infertility has been sustained.
The victims of infertility feel cheated: they are having to pay the
unsuspected costs of innovations carried out on a broad scale in
the name of several kinds of social progress. There is, then, a ·
special intensity to the conviction on the part of many childless
persons that society owes them a child of their own. 48
45.
46.

NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 72, 72-73.
Lamb discussions, supra note 25.
47. See Tilley, Assessment of Risks from DES: An Analysis of Research on Those
Exposed During Pregnancy or In Utero, in THE CusTOM-MADE CHILD (1981).
48. Some especially poignant versions of the view that society has a responsibility to
provide babies to those suffering from infertility are expressed by women who are sterile
as a consequence of their use of Dalkon Shields. Interviews by Wendy Kaufman, All
Things Considered, Nat'l Pub. Radio (Jan. 16, 1985).
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In the context of these feelings, a number of commentators
argue, not surprisingly, that the interest in procreation is of such
fundamental importance that it deserves constitutional protection. The most persuasive of these is John Robertson, who contends that the constitutionally protected freedom to avoid procreation implies its converse, the freedom to procreate.
Robertson defines this procreative freedom broadly enough to
encompass resort to noncoital methods of reproduction and to
third party reproductive "collaborators."49 From the many Supreme Court decisions protecting the right of parents to rear
and raise their children,5° Robertson spins out an argument for
according constitutional protection to efforts to bring children
into the world so that they can be reared. 111 Single persons as
well as married couples may have some claim to this "positive"
procreative freedom. An individual's alleged entitlement to seek
personal fulfillment through procreation should not hinge on
whether he or she is married, 112 especially if a child's welfare is
not jeopardized by having an unmarried parent. 53 Children
raised by single parents may experience more psychological and
social difficulties than children raised by two parents. 54 Nonetheless, it is not the particular family form in which a child lives
that seems to be crucial for the child's ultimate well-being, but
the nature of the personal relationships between the child and
49. Robertson, supra note 41, at 415-16, and 405, n.2.
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
51. Robertson, supra note 41, at 417. See also Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the
Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291 (1982).
52. Robertson admits he is on shakier constitutional grounds when he advocates extending the argument for procreative autonomy to single persons. Robertson, supra note
41, at 418. Even in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), only four Supreme Court
Justices referred explicitly to a single person's "right" to avoid conception. The Court
has not addressed directly either a married person's or a single person's alleged "right"
to conceive.
53. For an argument that single persons should enjoy as much procreative freedom as
married persons, see Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1981); for an argument that they should not, see Smith
& Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 263 (1984).
54. See, e.g., the results of an important study of children raised by single parents in
Dornbusch, Carlsmith, Bushwall, Ritter, Leiderman, Hastorf, & Gross, Single Parents,
Extended Households, and the Control of Adolescents, 56 CHILD DEV. 326 (1985). Based
on a representative national sample of adolescents, the authors studied the interrelations
among family structure, family decision-making, and deviant behavior among adolescents. They find that male children raised by single mothers show the greatest amount of
deviant behavior, as they define "deviance." Id. at 329. They also find, however, that the
presence of any adult in the household in addition to the mother reduces the level of the
adolescent's deviant social behavior.
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one or more caregivers. 1111
While subscribing to the general thrust of the argument for
constitutional protection of procreative choices,116 I have some
reservations. First, the cases cited in support of this argument
deal with the consequences of sexual activities. They do not address, and indeed, do not contemplate, the act of procreation
through the agency of laboratory techniques or with genetic contributions from third parties. 117 Second, I read the cases supporting parental autonomy and the values of family life118 as placing
greater emphasis on the opportunity to rear a child, and on the
vital social and cultural functions performed by childrearing,
than on the process by which a child is acquired; 59 A child's
55. See generally, Sroufe, The Coherence of Individual Development, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 834 (1979) (a useful introduction to contemporary versions of the attachment
theory of child development that originated in the work of John Bowlby); Ainsworth,
Bell & Stayton, Individual Differences in Strange Situation Behaviour of One-yearolds, in THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN SOCIAL RELATIONS 17 (H. Schaeffer ed. 1971). Although
they differ on a number of theoretical and practical issues, the psychological parenting
theorists and the attachment theorists would agree with the assertion that children
raised by single parents can turn out just as well or just as poorly as children raised by
two parents. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as GFS]; Waters & Noyes, Psychological
Parenting vs. Attachment Theory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505 (1983-84).
56. It is unlikely that English courts would ever find a protected right to procreative
freedom akin to what the U.S. Supreme Court might "locate." Parker, Surrogate Mothering: An Overview, 14 FAM. L. 140 (1984). For an articulate statement of the Christian,
and particularly the Catholic theological view that "no society has ever . . . understood
the methods and measures of reproduction to be a matter of private choice," see Noonan, Christian Tradition and the Control of Human Reproduction, J. OF CHRISTIAN
JURIS. 1 (1983).
57. Despite Robertson's assertion that a right to conceive can be derived from a right
to avoid conception, there is in fact no logical nexus between the two claimed "rights."
Surely, the opinions that deal with the dissemination of contraceptives to teenagers or
with the circumstances under which minors can have an abortion cannot be read as protecting an interest in becoming pregnant, H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Even
if these and other cases, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), are read as protecting an interest in intimate association, such an interest is also distinct from an interest in resorting to third party collaborators to produce a child. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624 (1980). An elaboration of the distinction between protecting against unwanted
pregnancies and protecting an interest in conceiving was made in the legal analysis prepared for the EAB; see Flannery, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro
Fertilization, 67 GEO. L.J. 1295, 1302-04 (1979).
58. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 50, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 421 U.S.
494 (1977).
59. These cases assume the existence of a child within a nuclear or extended family
setting. They deal with the reciprocal nature of parental rights and duties towards their
children, not with the process of bringing the children into existence. For discussions of
just how far removed the childrearing cases are from any claims for a broad right to
procreative, as opposed to parental autonomy, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973); Hafen, The Constitutional Status of
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right to be reared and society's stake in protecting a child's need
for parenting deservedly gets more attention than an adult's interest in propagating. 60 Third, neither the Supreme Court nor·
any lower federal court has accorded any constitutional protection to claims by adoptees that they have a fundamental interest
in connecting with their genealogical heritage and should therefore be permitted to learn the identity of their biological parents. 61 Adoptees have argued that in denying them this information, states have irreparably injured their sense of
"personhood." 62 Is it reasonable, then, to expect that an adult's
claim for constitutional protection for an interest in connecting
to future generations through the use of noncoital means of reMarriage, Kin..•hip, & Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983). From a different perspective, Thomas Grey argues that the
"Court has given no support to the notion that the right to privacy protects seimal freedom." Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83, 86.
60. In recent cases that consider the circumstances under which the parental rights of
biological parents may be terminated, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), the Court has protected relational interests between parents and their children against termination procedures that do not accord with
due process requirements. In recent cases that consider the interests of unwed fathers in
obtaining custody of their biological offspring, or in preventing the adoption of those
offspring by someone other than a blood relative, the Court has decidedly refused to
grant such parental prerogatives to any father simply on the basis of his biological relationship to his child. The Court has protected the parental interests of only those unwed
fathers who have entered into and attempted to sustain an actual personal and emotional relationship with their offspring, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The procreative act alone has been a basis for imposing
financial responsibilities on biological parents, but it has never been the basis by itself
for granting custodial rights or for preventing the adoption of the child by someone else.
The scope of constitutional protection of the rights of unwed fathers has been much
discussed and is generally beyond the scope of this paper. A useful recent analysis is in
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 995 (1979). State courts have been similarly unresponsive; see, e.g., In re Roger
B., 84 Ill.2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
62. Although many state courts have permitted the disclosure of birth parents' identities to adoptees, they have not done so on the basis of constitutional analysis, but by
construing broadly the "good cause" exceptions typically included in non-disclosure statutes. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372
A.2d 646 (1977). Instead of pursuing their constitutional claims, those interested in
opening adoption records have turned to state legislatures where they are beginning .to
have greater success. About 18-20 states now have some kind of procedure through which
adoptees may be able to learn the identities of their birth parents. These recent statutory changes are summarized in Pierce, Survey of State Laws & Legislation on Access to·
Adoption Records, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3035 (1984). At least two other states have
created similar registry procedures since Pierce completed his survey, 11 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 1128 (1985).
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production would be taken more seriously than the adoptee's desire to be linked back in time to his or her genetic heritage?
Fourth, even if the claims for procreative autonomy were to be
explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, federal and state governments would not be obliged to subsidize IVF or ET research
and treatment, nor to do more than accept the general validity
of surrogacy arrangements. 63
To date, there have been no sustained efforts to prohibit IVF
or ET,64 nor are any likely to develop so long as these procedures are used primarily for relief of infertility and not to generate embryos either for experimental purposes or to rearrange
their genetic composition. 611 And despite some indications to the
contrary, a few state courts, acting without explicit enabling legislation,66 are recognizing the validity of certain aspects of surrogacy arrangements. 67 From a practical perspective, if not from a
63. In the abortion context, cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (finding no public
duty to provide abortion services to low-income women).
64. In 1979 Illinois enacted a statute intended to discourage physicians from offering
IVF, but subsequent interpretations of the statute by the State Attorney General have
narrowed its scope. Pennsylvania has taken steps to monitor the results of IVF and ET,
but has not moved to prohibit these services, Andrews, supra note 4, at 793.
65. At hearings held before the EAB in 1978-79, opposition to research on or to
"tinkering" with "extra" embryos was more vociferous than was any concern about the
use of IVF and ET as infertility treatments; see EAB REP., supra note 6; Abramowitz,
supra note 6.
66. Legislation to regulate surrogacy contracts has been introduced in more than
twenty states and the District of Columbia. Most of these bills would validate at least
some aspects of surrogacy arrangements, but several would attempt to ban all forms of
commercial surrogacy. These bills are listed and briefly summarized in Pierce, Survey of
State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP. (B.N.A.) 3001 (1985).
One court has interpreted its state legislature's failure to enact a measure explicitly legitimizing surrogacy as a "clear signal" that surrogacy violates the state's general statutory
ban against baby-selling, Kentucky v. SPA, Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985).
67. The Michigan Supreme Court has reversed a Court of Appeals decision that had
held that the state courts lacked jurisdiction to determine the paternity of a child born
to a married woman pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122
Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985). The
Michigan court found that the state's Paternity Act should not bar the alleged father
from having his paternity and his child support obligations established, despite the two
statutory presumptions that treat the child born after the artificial insemination of the
mother as the legal child of the mother and her husband. According to the court, neither
presumption will operate to stop the alleged biological father from establishing his paternity, if the mother's husband will simply withhold his consent to his wife's AID. This is
an awkward way of recognizing the validity of surrogacy agreements because in practice,
they do not proceed unless the surrogate gestator's husband agrees to her AID. The procedure suggested by the Michigan court requires that the surrogate's husband agree in
fact to his wife's AID, while "officially" withholding his consent in order to fulfill the
requirements of the Paternity Act. It is preferable to create a statutory presumption that
would permit the determination of paternity in accord with the intentions of the parties
to the surrogacy agreement without having to pretend that what does occur did not in
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constitutional one, attempts to prohibit these activities would be
ill-advised. Our experience with past crusades against behavior
that some people find distasteful or immoral (for example,
drinking, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality) has shown the
futility of legislation against morally-controversial conduct for
which there is strong social support. Childless couples would no
doubt take recourse to surreptitious purveyors of reproductive
services. Prices would rise, noncoital baby-production would be
subject to even less monitoring than it is now, and the welfare of
all the participants, especially of the offspring, would be
jeopardized. 68
Our attention is best directed, however, not toward the uncertain future course of constitutional doctrine, but toward the unresolved legal and policy issues presented by the bustling commercial market that already exists for noncoital reproductive
services. I will select a few of the issues now being discussed in
professional journals and in more general publications69 for
closer examination. My aim is to show both how difficult and
fact occur. See infra text accompanying notes 169-79. The court's decision does not address such other aspects of surrogacy agreements as the payment of a fee to the surrogate or the adoption of the child by the biological father's wife. For the moment at least,
an earlier Michigan Court of Appeals decision declaring unenforceable any agreement to
make payments in connection with an adoption or release of parental rights remains
intact, Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1183 (1983). See also Kentucky v. SPA, Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (1985), where
the Kentucky Court of Appeals declared unlawful "any contracts and procedures [that
seek] to financially benefit from the contractual creation of human life and its subsequent transfer for what must be considered adoptive purposes." In contrast, a District of
Columbia court ordered an investigation of the circumstances surrounding a surrogacy
contract and suggested that if the court can be satisfied that the agreement was not
fraudulently obtained, it would seek ways to construe the D.C. Paternity and Adoption
Acts so as to permit the contract to be fully performed. In re R.K.S., 10 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 1383 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. 1984).
68. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhiie to respond to the reservations just expressed
about the constitutional argument for procreative autonomy and to continue exploring
the contours of that argument. The claims for constitutional protection are useful for
challenging any restrictive statutes that might be passed, as well as for seeking a narrow
construction of existing prohibitory measures and a broad reading of those statutes and
regulations that could support noncoital reproductive services. Robertson, supra note 41,
has not convinced me that a broad right to conceive can be implied from a right not to
conceive, but his persistence is admirable.
69. In addition to the comprehensive discussions in Robertson, supra note 41, and
Wadlington, supra note 23, and the impassioned arguments about the moral and social
implications of the new reproductive possibilities in Kass, supra note 5, there are more
than a dozen recent law review commentaries on the issues raised by noncoital reproduction, as well as countless articles in the popular press and in such medical journals as
FERTILITY & STERILITY, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, J. OF HUM. REPROD'N, J.A.M.A. and
the British journals, LANCET and NATURE. Although some of these mention the issues I
discuss here, most do not analyze them in much detail, nor try to develop, as I hope to
do, a special focus on the interests of the offspring.
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how essential it is to create a regulatory apparatus that would
not place the government in the business of controlling human
reproduction 70 but which would, in accord with the principles
.sketched above, 71 1) facilitate procreative choices, 2) minimize
the risk of harm to the participants, especially the children, and
3) provide some mechanism for assuring and improving the
quality of the services offered by doctors, lawyers and other
intermediaries.
Ill.

REGULATION OF THE BABY-MAKING MARKET:

A

FRAMEWORK

FOR NEEDED PROTECTIONS

A.

Facilitating Choices

To facilitate the reproductive choices of childless persons,
some combination of public and private action is needed: first,
to aid these persons in making an informed and voluntary decision rather than an imposed one; next, to ensure that, once
made, a decision can be acted upon; and finally, to support, although not necessarily to guarantee, the fulfillment of the reasonable expectation that the end result will be a healthy child.
1. Facilitating informed and voluntary decisions- An informed and voluntary decision is not easily reached. The childless face a bewildering array of possibilities. Even if the costs of
different alternatives were identical, which they are not, and all
alternatives were equally available, which they are not, it would
remain difficult to assess the appropriateness of any given alternative for particular people. For example, is the prospect of an
IVF child who is related genetically to both parents sufficiently
attractive to offset for a woman the physical discomfort and
70. See, e.g., the warning of the EAB: "Where reproductive decisions are concerned,
it is important to guard against unwarranted governmental intrusion into personal and
marital privacy," EAB REP., supra note 6. Many commentators are fond of conjuring up
Huxleyan and Orwellian images to remind us of the dangers inherent in public control of
reproduction; see, e.g., Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:
Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1983)
(not as useful for its analysis as for its listing of the science fictional accounts of public
control of reproduction and for its list of other articles on issues raised by IVF, ET and
surrogacy). I am reminded of the Nazi government's declaration that the nation's stock
of ovaries were a natural resource and the property of the German state, R.N. Proctor,
The Politics of Purity: Origins of the Ideal of Neutral Science 501 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University 1984) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.), and of the
current efforts of the Chinese government to restrict family size.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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risks associated with superovulation drugs, a surgical egg-retrieval procedure under anaesthesia, a predictable number of
spontaneous miscarriages of an implanted embryo, or a pregnancy that is otherwise complicated and may terminate prema-.
turely? 12 Is the allure sufficient to offset for the couple the risk
of possible physical harm to their offspring from the process of
in vitro fertilization and incubation? What about an eventual
psychological let down if their specially produced child fails to
live up to their perhaps exaggerated expectations for her or for
what her existence would do for the quality of their lives? Alternatively, for those who are potential candidates for either in vitro fertilization or donor embryo transfer, is a woman compensated for her lack of a genetic connection to her child by the fact
that ET does not involve any surgical procedures and does offer
her an opportunity to experience pregnancy? And what of the
intended father's psychological reaction to the use of his sperm
to artificially inseminate an anonymous egg and embryo donor?
How can a couple determine whether the physical or psychological risks associated with IVF or ET are comparable to those associated with surgical or other medical procedures used to repair
damaged oviducts or to otherwise improve the chances for "natural" reproduction? How can a couple who is queasy about difficult and protracted medical procedures assess whether hiring a
surrogate uterine hostess constitutes a more suitable alternative
for them? By turning to this medically simpler but legally and
psychologically more complicated alternative, does the couple
take on a different but equally imponderable set of risks to
themselves, their offspring, and the surrogate? For which
couples will the desire to have a child be satisfied by adopting
someone not related biologically to either of them? Will the degree of this satisfaction be affected if the adopted child is one
who previously suffered emotional or physical deprivation or
who, without their decision to adopt him or her, might have
been deprived of an opportunity to form a stable attachment to
any parents?
Childless persons ought to be made cognizant of the full range
of their reproductive and childrearing options, including adoption. They deserve some guidance about how to determine which
alternatives are medically or physically appropriate for them.
And they need some clues about how to evaluate the psychological, financial, and legal consequences of each alternative. At
72. For a graphic description of the procedures entailed by IVF, see Yovich,
Monozygotic Twins from IVF, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 833 (1984).
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least one "consumer's guide" to the new reproductive techniques
has appeared. 73 An artificial intelligence program to help infertile couples choose an appropriate treatment is in the works. 74
The media have been filled with personal "human interest" accounts of experiences with IVF, ET, and surrogacy. 71~ More systematic and personal reproductive counseling services already
are available in the private market. IVF clinics and many of the
lawyers who arrange surrogacy contracts claim that they provide
such counseling. 76 In Britain, the Warnock Commission has recommended that publicly-subsidized investigations and consultations be offered to all individuals with a potential infertility
problem and that psychological counseling be routinely included
in any infertility treatment. 77 In this country, such services
might provide a valuable supplement to services available in the
private sector, especially if they were to become part of an ongoing public monitoring of the quality and success of noncoital
reproduction. 78
·
Publicly-funded reproductive counseling is, of course, unlikely
to be available in the United States within the foreseeable future. 79 Yet a special public responsibility exists to protect the
welfare of children whose parentage may end up being the subject of private contracts. Because the state, rather than private
individuals, ultimately confers the legal status of parent and
child, the state may justifiably be concerned that persons who
73. L.B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS (1984).
74. Diamond, Student Applies Artificial Intelligence to Infertility, Stanford Campus
Report, Oct. 24, 1984, at 13.
75. E.g., the Donahue show and other TV talk-shows; Markoutsas, Women Who
Have Babies for Other Women, Goon HOUSEKEEPING, Apr. 1981, at 96.
76. Lamb discussions, supra note 25. See also 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY (1984), and
Handel, supra note 22. One gets the impression, however, that the activity characterized
as counseling is in fact a device for physicians and lawyers to weed out "emotionally
unstable" persons from consideration for a particular service or treatment.
77. WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, ch. 2, § 2.12.
78. For a discussion of such public monitoring, see infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
79. The United States has fewer publicly subsidized educational, counseling, and
health services addressed to issues of human sexuality and reproduction than do most
other advanced industrialized countries. An important recent study by the Alan
Guttmacher Institute indicates that the rates of adolescent (ages 15-19) pregnancies and
abortions in the United States are substantially higher than the rates in Sweden, France,
the Netherlands, Canada, England, and Wales where sex education is routinely taught,
and contraceptives are inexpensive or free. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 1. This
study of teen-age sexuality is relevant to an analysis of the government's role in the new
reproductive techniques because it suggests a causal connection between the public support of services pertaining to the relief of childlessness and the capacity of childless individuals to make informed and appropriate decisions about their own conduct.
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separate the genetic from the gestational and nurturing aspects
of parenting fully comprehend what they are doing. And the
state's interest in assuring all children an opportunity to have
parents calls for more sustained efforts to make adoption a feasible and attractive alternative to childless couples. 80 This requires something more than general dissemination of information about reproduction. This is not to suggest, however, that
there "must" be publicly supported reproductive counseling, nor
that public services should preempt private ones. 81 But the
state's interest provides a reason to propose that some combination of private and public reproductive counseling be made
much more widely available than is now the case. 82 As a policy
matter, public funds would be spent better now to support such
services than spent in the future to alleviate what may prove to
be the unfortunate consequences of uninformed or unreflective
private decisions. 83
Whether reproductive counselors are privately or publicly subsidized, what would they do? In theory, reproductive counseling
seems less intrusive than screening for parental "fitness."84
Counselors would assist people to choose an option appropriate
to their particular medical, psychological, and financial situations, rather than deny them an opportunity to make certain
choices. In practice, counselors who have doubts about a couple's
parenting capacity could profess neutrality, while actually attempting to dissuade them from seeking to obtain a child. Even
the truly "neutral" counselor would have difficulty defining her
task. Our knowledge about noncoital reproductive processes and
their long run consequences is far from complete and our attitudes toward these processes are still being formed. The values
we attach to parenting and to different styles of family life lack
80. It should surely call for reluctance to eliminate what few incentives now exist for
people to adopt children.
81. Recall the warnings, supra note 70.
82. Such counseling may be as important, if not more so, for any third party participant in noncoital reproduction: the paid contributors of sperm, eggs, embryos, or babies.
The discussion here, however, considers the wisdom of providing counseling for childless
persons who are trying to decide whether to pursue IVF, ET, AID, or surrogacy.
83. I do not intend to argue that reproductive counseling services deserve a higher
priority than, for example, preventive social services for adults determined to be in a
high risk category as potential child abusers. But I believe that a general commitment to
avoid state intervention in private procreative choices is consistent with supporting occasional interventions that are likely to improve the quality of those choices, as well as
protect the welfare of any offspring. See generally Professor Wald's Introduction to this
Symposium, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 799 (1985).
84. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of how such
screening can be a futile and potentially harmful enterprise.
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the stability they may have shown in the past. Given these uncertainties, the most salient characteristic of good reproductive
counseling may be listing questions for people to ponder, rather
than providing standards or guidelines for resolving them.
Counseling may also illustrate for prospective parents the difference between a thorough understanding of suitable procreative alternatives and "informed consent" to a particular medical
treatment or legal procedure. The medical personnel who offer
IVF, ET, or AID secure the "informed consent" of their patients
primarily to protect themselves against future allegations of
malpractice. They ask patients to accept the risk of legal ambiguities as well as of physical or psychological harms85 and to absolve the medical professionals from responsibility for providing
compensation in the event that such harms actually occur. 86 In
the context of surrogate gestator contracts, informed consent
similarly allocates risks between the uterine hostess and the intended parents, as well as between these parties and their lawyers. 87 In contrast, a different standard evaluates efforts to facilitate informed decisions by infertile couples. Counselors aim to
get such couples to contemplate what they are prepared to endure in order to obtain a child. This includes, but is not limited
to, the legal question of how many of the risks of medical and
legal procedures they are willing to assume. The interests protected in the two cases are distinct: informed consent limits the
liability of the professionals upon whom the adults who want to
become parents must rely, while informed decision making aims
to safeguard the interests of adults in pursuing what they themselves have determined to be their most appropriate route to
parenting.
2. Facilitating implementation of decisions- Once childless
85. Buster interview, supra note 29. See also the Information Pamphlet for Participating Couples from the Harbor-UCLA Medical Center Ovum Transfer Program. (Copy
on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.)
86. Among the more useful analyses of informed consent in the context of the patient-doctor relationship are PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982); Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and
the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984); Schneyer, Informed Consent
and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wisc. L.
REV. 124.
87. California attorneys William Handel and Bernard Sherwyn describe, almost with
glee, how they ask childless clients to consent to their performance of what might be
criminal or tortious activities in the interests of completing a surrogacy arrangement,
Handel, supra note 22; Sherwyn, Attorney Duties in the Area of New Reproductive
Technologies, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 799 (1984).
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couples decide which parenting option they wish to pursue, how
can they be assisted to act effectively upon their choice? Allocation of any scarce resource, like noncoital reproductive services,
inevitably denies access to some people. The challenge is to develop selection criteria that do not unduly burden procreative
autonomy. These criteria should be relevant to the characteristics of a particular service and should be applied neutrally-that
is, in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory-among those who meet the relevant criteria. A prospective
parent's medical condition is surely relevant to the allocation decision. Also relevant may be a person's psychological capacity to
tolerate the complex medical procedures and legal ambiguities
entailed in noncoital reproduction. 88 The principle of neutrality
would not be violated by insisting that people have certain diagnostic tests, nor, for example, by excluding from IVF a woman
who has had a- hysterectomy.
Where does the search for relevant criteria and neutral principles of application go once the threshold of eligibility has been
established? It depends on who determines "relevance." One
decisionmaker might value the goal of giving all adults an opportunity to be parents. In that event, priority might be given to
those adults who have never had children or who are nearly too
old to bear or raise a child. Or, for example, instead of giving a
small number of people up to five chances to conceive through
IVF, a larger number of persons might each be given one chance.
Another decisionmaker might place uppermost the welfare of
children, serving only married couples who are "fit" potential
parents and refusing to serve unmarried persons. If a third decisionmaker hoped to validate a certain procedure as a legitimate
treatment rather than as a mere "experiment," priority might
not go to those for whom the procedure is a last resort but to
younger men and women who are in excellent general health and
who, although childless, have not exhausted their finances and
their psyches through years of futile efforts to conceive. Still another decisionmaker might believe that procreative autonomy is
so broad as to encompass efforts to select the "best" combination of genetic materials and gestational environments for producing a child. In this case, even a threshold requirement of infertility might yield to selection by lottery or, at the other
88. Many physicians would prefer to exclude from IVF or ET those individuals whose
anxiety is so pervasive that they are unlikely to achieve a viable pregnancy, no matter
how many sophisticated medical procedures they undergo. It is not clear, however, that
there are any reliable tests for discerning those we might call the "permanently psychosomatic infertile." Lamb discussions, supra note 25; Buster interview, supra note 29.
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extreme, to selection according to who is willing to pay the highest price for a "custom-made" child.
At present, allocation decisions for IVF and ET are being
made by private physicians and hospital personnel, acting for
the most part in a private commercial and professional context. 89 It should come as no surprise that the medical professionals are selecting patients according to criteria at the more socially conservative end of the spectrum sketched above. Indeed,
the word "patients," rather than "customers" or "clients," terms
preferred by the private investors in IVF and ET clinics,90
manifests the physicians' desire to be associated with a reputable medical endeavor. The doctors hope to garner financial support for research to improve the quality of IVF and ET procedures and to learn more about embryo development and the
reproductive process. They emphatically deny any interest in
"gene manipulation" and insist that IVF and ET are simply
promising "infertility treatments."91 Obstetricians and gynecologists already contend with large numbers of malpractice claims
and pay some of the highest settlements. 92 Understandably risk
averse, they do not wish to lose their chances for securing broad
social and financial support for IVF and ET by treating "uncooperative" people,93 or those with idiosyncratic life styles. 94 In
89. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
90. Embryo transfer specialist, Dr. Buster, claims, for example, that he is somewhat
uneasy about the commercial terminology used by the venture capitalists who have supplied the research funds for his ET program. Nonetheless, he stresses the importance of
using "the best marketing and business principles" and talks of "overnight delivery networks" for speeding three- to five-day-old embryos to potential recipients who will gestate them. Buster interview, supra note 29. See also the accounts of the commercial
prospects for ET in Brotman, supra note 29; Chapman, Going for the Gold in the Baby
Business, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 41.
91. See, e.g., HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (1984);
Abramowitz, supra note 6; American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on IVF, 41
FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984) [hereinafter cited as AFS Statement].
92. In the years 1975-78, nearly 15% of total malpractice claims filed were against
obstetrician-gynecologists, and 18% of the awards were paid by them or, more accurately, by their insurers. 2 NAIC MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 3 (1978). Since then, these rates
have continued to rise, Malcolm, Fear of Malpractice Suits Spurring Some Doctors to
Leave Obstetrics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
93. Dr. Buster was so eager to project the "correct" view of ET that his medical team
hired a public relations consultant to supervise media coverage of their activities. Buster
interview, supra note 29.
94. Of the licensed physicians who perform traditional AID, only 10% report that
they will treat an unmarried woman, Curie-Cohen, supra note 24, at 595. Several sperm
banks willingly serve lesbians and unmarried heterosexual women; for example, the
Women's Health Center in Oakland, California. See REP. HuM. REPROD. L. R-30 (1982).
The recent publication in FERTILITY AND STERILITY of an article sympathetic to the AID
of single women suggests that attitudes toward unmarried AID parents may be changing.
McGuire & Alexander, Artificial Insemination of Single Women, 43 FERTILITY & STERIL-
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sum, medical professionals are less interested in treating all people who could benefit from laboratory-assisted conception than
in helping those who could enhance the reputation of IVF and
ET.
As a consequence of these concerns, medical personnel screen
prospective candidates for IVF or ET not merely to determine if
their infertility problem is amenable to these treatments. Candidates must also be married, 911 have the ability to pay, and be
perceived by the medical staff as fit potential parents. The lawyers who facilitate surrogacy contracts are probably applying
similar criteria to prospective parents. But except for the statements of a few lawyer-brokers, 96 who claim to be scrupulous in
their search for "emotionally stable" couples and surrogates, information is scarce on the selection criteria they actually use. In
some ways, access to surrogacy may be easier than access to IVF
or ET, because couples are asked fewer questions about the reasons for their childlessness. But in other ways, access may be as
or more limited because the number of acceptable uterine hostesses is not nearly as large as the number of prospective parenting couples, and because many couples exclude themselves after
learning of the legal and psychological ambiguities that surround
surrogacy. Except for a brief analysis of the commercial aspects
of surrogacy, 97 my discussion of access to noncoital reproduction
focuses on access to IVF and ET.
The search for parental fitness is not worth the effort. In addition to raising some constitutional concerns about imposing on
couples who seek IVF or ET a standard that is not applied to
those who engage in coital reproduction, it is not at all clear that
such a search will yield reliable results. Childless couples who
have spent years trying to conceive are not likely to appreciate
any questioning of their capacity to be good parents. Anyone
who has glanced at the case law or literature on the termination
of parental rights knows that we have a hard time figuring out
which people are unfit parents. 98 Even less consensus exists on
182 (1985).
95. Cf. WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, which recommends providing treatment for
"couples," meaning "heterosexual couples living together in a stable relationship,
whether married or not," §§ 2.5-2.12.
96. See, e.g., Handel, supra note 22; Keane & Breo, supra note 32; Sherwyn, supra
note 87.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 111-18.
98. See, e.g., Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557 (1983-84) for a thoughtful account by someone who has had
to test the assumptions and purported findings of the social science literature on the
issue of parental "unfitness" against her complex and troubling experience as a New
ITV
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what makes for "fitness" in a parent. This is not to deny that
protecting the welfare of children warrants some concern about
the characteristics of the adults who will raise them. But the
small number of unworthies who might be detected and weeded
out by fitness screening hardly justifies the financial and social
costs of trying to devise reliable tests. Nothing in the history of
adoption suggests that even the elaborate investigation of potential parents by adoption agencies using socially conservative criteria, permits reliable prediction of how fit these parents will actually be. What these criteria and investigations do succeed in
doing, however, is to discourage people who are concerned about
their privacy, or convinced that they will not pass muster, from
seeking a child through adoption agencies. Many of these people
have found babies, independently, through less intrusive nonagency intermediaries. 99 Surrogacy arrangements may, in fact,
be simply an "innovation" in the well-established market for independent adoptions. The agencies have never been able to
demonstrate that those who acquired their children independently have any less parenting ability than those who acquired
children through agencies. 100 If what the gatekeepers to
noncoital reproduction really want to know is whether the
couple who intend to raise a child will remain married to each
other, no test will elicit such information. Funds would be better
spent on counseling services to assist couples in dealing with the
special problems that raising an IVF or ET child might pose
than on attempting to ferret out "unsuitable" parents.
Skepticism about screening for parental fitness would be even
more appropriate if the government were someday to join the
York City Family Court judge.
99. An influential Note written 35 years ago argued persuasively that the "agencies
themselves are partially to blame for the fact that three out of every four adoptions are
independently arranged." Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated
Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 736 (1950). Since then, adoption agency efforts to convince
birth mothers or prospective adoptive parents to deal with them, rather than with independent doctors or lawyers, have been notably unsuccessful. MEEZAN, supra note 9, reports that many prospective adoptive parents perceive adoption agency procedures as
inflexible and intrusive and therefore turn to the independent baby-market. Meezan's
critique of agency practices has particular importance because his study was commissioned in the 1970's by the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), a voluntary association of adoption and other child welfare agencies who have long opposed independent
placements. For other accounts of how adoptive parents resent broad inquiries by agencies into their social, religious, financial, sexual, and personal behaviors, see H. KIRK,
SHARED FATE (1964); A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN, R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978)
[hereinafter cited as ADOPTION TRIANGLE); Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions,
71 A.B.A. J., June 1985, at 53, 54.
100. There are no CWLA or other agency-sponsored studies showing that children
placed independently fare less well than those placed by agencies.
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private entrepreneurs and offer IVF or ET in publicly-subsidized clinics. The temptation to look for couples and gene donors who could improve the quality of our species would be
great and the temptation to prevent certain people from becoming parents would be even greater. 101 At present, the federal and
state governments are only indirectly involved with IVF or ET.
Clinics associated with public hospitals or universities could face
constitutional challenges if they rejected a potential patient because of marital status 102 or for an alleged lack of parenting
skills.
Because there is no federal funding for IVF or ET research,
physicians are not required to submit their research protocols to
an institutional review board (IRB) for prior approval. 103 Even if
federal funds were available, IRB approval would not be necessary if physicians claimed they were offering treatment, rather
than doing research. Nonetheless, to protect themselves as well
as their patients, physicians may voluntarily seek IRB approval
before embarking on IVF or ET programs. 104 If this occurs, the
selection process will be responsive to whatever criteria are
deemed suitable by the IRBs, which function both as quasi-federal administrative agencies and as local review boards. 1011 Perhaps the best that we could hope for, if public oversight of IVF
and ET increases, is that rather than devising their own criteria,
public review boards would simply see to it that the private
decisionmakers did not turn anyone away for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons. 106
101. Some commentators have proposed a general state licensing scheme for parents.
See, e.g., LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 182 (1980).
102. At least one such challenge was raised by a single woman whose request for
artificial insemination was denied by the sperm bank affiliated with Wayne State Medical School. She sued, claiming violation of her constitutional right to procreative autonomy, but the suit was settled before trial when Wayne agreed to treat her. For an account of the incident, see Note, The 14th Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right
to be a Single Parent through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
251, 254 (1982).
103. IRB approval is required for any federally funded research involving human
subjects, R. LEVINE, ETHICS & REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1981); Quigley & Andrews, supra note 7, at 350.
104. Lamb discussions, supra note 25.
105. Levine, supra note 103, at 208-12. Before its demise, the EAB, supra note 6,
recommended that IVF or ET be limited to married couples using their own sperm and
ova. IRS-determined criteria might be somewhat broader, allowing the use of third party
genetic contributions, but not receptive to the prospect of treating unmarried persons.
Abramowitz, supra note 6; Quigley & Andrews, supra note 7.
106. IRBs are required to see to it that the selection of human subjects for medical
research is "equitable," 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(3) (1985). Cf. the recommendation in the
WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, at § 2.13, that anyone denied access to a particular infertility treatment be given a full statement of the reasons for the denial.
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The requirement that the couple have the ability to pay their
physicians, as well as any third party gene contributors, actually
cuts several ways. Because most insurance companies and health
maintenance organizations have refused to pay for IVF or ET, 107
only those couples with a significant amount of money to spare
can afford to enter the market. 108 Thus, as with other costly and
considerably more sophisticated procedures (for example, heart
transplants), a great many people who could benefit from IVF
and ET are excluded by financial considerations. This situation
could change, however, if the proponents of IVF and ET convince the insurance companies that these procedures would be
more efficacious and less costly than tuboplasty or other surgical
measures designed to alleviate infertility. 100 Among those who
can afford to pay today's high rates, there are bound to be
couples who resent elaborate medical or psychological screening.
They may exert pressure on IVF and ET clinics to ease both
medical and parental fitness requirements. Perhaps it is more
accurate to suggest that the clinics with strict eligibility requirements may find themselves with fewer patients than the clinics
that care less about the social characteristics of the people they
treat. Another possibility is that couples who are well off will
seek treatment at small private clinics that develop reputations
for being emotionally supportive, rather than at large medical
centers which may have a greater range of technical services, but
which are perceived to be indifferent to the emotional aspects of
repeated efforts to conceive a child. 110
Because the clinics need fees from patients to cover their own
expenses, they will be under some competitive pressure to attract childless couples and may move toward more flexible selection criteria, as well as toward lower fees. If, however, IVF procedures prove to be more successful in certain clinical settings
107. Their rationale is that success rates are too low, the long term safety is untested,
and the procedures are "not medically necessary." Lamb discussions, supra note 25. Several lawsuits are pending against medical insurers and health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), alleging that their characterization of IVF and ET as "experimental" or
"merely cosmetic" is made in bad faith to justify denial of coverage; telephone interview
with Lauren Hallinan, San Francisco lawyer representing women suing Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (June 10, 1985). See also Carlsen, Women Sue Kaiser Over In Vitro
Coverage, S.F. Chronicle, May 31, 1985, at 6. Most health insurance carriers and HMOs
will pay, however, for expenses incurred during pregnancy, including diagnostic procedures such as amniocentesis or ultrasound.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
109. Lamb discussions, supra note 25; Buster interview, supra note 29.
110. See, e.g., AFS Statement, supra note 91, which recommends that sufficient attention be given to the emotional needs of patients.
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than in others, the clinics with the highest childbirth rates may
impose stricter eligibility criteria and charge even higher fees.
This raises yet another aspect of the present price structure that
may operate either to exclude or include people who are otherwise medically eligible. Among those couples who can afford to
pay, some can afford to pay a great deal more than others. Will
the purveyors of IVF and ET permit those who can afford a
large number of attempts at conception as many attempts as
they want? Will the purveyors be willing to accept a premium
price for more attempts, or will the price be the same for all?
How strong are the pressures for creating highly competitive
sales of the "right" to have a child? The economic and market
considerations that determine the capacity of childless couples
to act on their procreative choices are troublesome because symbolically, if not actually, they may commodify, and thus demean,
the children who are the end-products of these transactions.
Much ink has been spilled deploring the commercial aspects
of surrogacy contracts, m while very little has been devoted to
questioning the legitimacy of requiring payments for the technically sophisticated IVF or ET procedures. Yet, as we have just
seen, exercising any of these choices involves going to the private
market and paying a fee for the production of a child. Why
should surrogacy evoke such a different response about payment? IVF and ET take place in antiseptic, clinical surroundings; conception occurs in a petri dish or in the reproductive system of a carefully monitored ovum-contributor under the
watchful eye of physicians and laboratory technicians. In contrast, after the artificial insemination under medical supervision
of a surrogate gestator, the main task of baby-production occurs
in the real world of personal and social interaction. But, in all
these situations, a third person serves as the agent of a couple's
reproductive efforts, and the fact that the surrogate is not subject to continuous monitoring in the laboratory should not be a
reason to deny that she is performing a service that deserves
compensation. If it is acceptable to pay the doctors who serve as
surrogate fallopian tubes, or the men and women who contribute
the genetic material in their sperm or ova, it should be equally
acceptable to pay the woman who is contributing the temporary
use of her womb. The payments are not to purchase a child, but
to compensate for personal services.
111. See, e.g., Annas & Elias, supra note 70; Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate
Parenting, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35 (1983); WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, ch. 8 and
part 4.
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As we move from the question of whether there should be any
payment to the question of how much should be paid, the quality of the experience for the different agents of reproduction becomes relevant. The physically and emotionally complex experience of bearing a child demands much more of the surrogate
than does the impersonal, detached, and more circumscribed experience of the egg, embryo, or sperm donor. Precisely because
of the demanding quality of her experience, the uterine hostess
deserves payment for the medical and other out-of-pocket expenses directly related to her pregnancy. In addition, she deserves compensation for the long run physical costs associated
with childbearing and for the emotional costs of relinquishing
the child she bears. 112 Once the surrogacy route is chosen, it can
become exploitive not because the surrogate is paid, but because
of the risk that she will be underpaid. m
Nonetheless, the commercial aspects of surrogacy are problematic because the technical distinction between buying a child
and paying for personal services may obscure the fact that the
transaction still involves the exchange of a live child for money.
Should our principle of supporting procreative choice yield to
the interest in protecting the welfare of a child, when a childless
couple wants to pay not merely for "assisted" conception, as in
IVF or ET, but for the right to raise another human being? The
answer depends on the extent of actual "trafficking" that takes
place. In my view, no trafficking is involved if the payment
merely compensates for services associated with the intentional
gestation of a particular child who will be genetically related to
at least one of the parents who will raise her. Indeed, there are
many precedents in which courts have honored "family compacts" providing for the relinquishment of parental rights to a
relative in exchange for a promise to support the child, or in
exchange for a fee to the surrendering parent. 114 The greater the
112. See infra text accompanying notes 136-44 for a discussion of how the emotional
complexities of surrogacy arrangements may affect their performance.
113. Cf. the recognition by those who have been critical of independent adoptions
that many birth mothers prefer to place their children independently because of assur.ances that they will be reimbursed for their medical and other expenses. MEEZAN. supra
note 9, at 229. The Meezan study also recognizes that the risk of exploitation of birth
mothers is reduced if lists of legally reimbursable expenses are established. Id. at 235.
114. See, e.g., Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894)(upholding a promise
by mother to relinquish custody of her son to his paternal grandfather in exchange for
payments to her and the child as an enforceable "family compact" based on motives of
"blood and affection"); Clark v. Clark, 122 Md. 114, 89 A. 405 (Md. Ct. App. 1913) (upholding promise by mother to relinquish son to the custody of his paternal grandfather
in exchange for payments to her for her life). Similar and more recent cases are cited and
discussed in Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L.
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amount by which payments exceed the tangible and intangible
costs incurred by the gestator, the less justifiable the transaction
seems.
A different step toward baby-selling is taken if payments disproportionate to a birth mother's expenses are made in order to
induce her to surrender a child she originally bore as the result
of an unintended pregnancy, or to raise within her own family.
In other words, as the payments come closer to being for the
child herself rather than compensating for services actually performed by a birth mother, the potential for commodifying babies
becomes more real. A similar risk would be posed by IVF and
ET if "excess" embryos were routinely frozen and auctioned off
to the highest bidders. 1111 Unlike Landes and Posner, 116 I, along
with other commentators, 117 find these prospects abhorrent. To
diminish the danger of commodifying children, the state, or the
private lawyers and physicians involved in noncoital reproduction, could establish a minimum and maximum range of financial compensation for these services. In surrogacy arrangements,
it is especially important to assure that surrogates are adequately compensated and that lawyer-facilitators are not
overcompensated. 118
3. Supporting reasonable expectations- The third component of the goal of facilitating procreative autonomy requires
seeking ways to assure that the reasonable expectations of the
REP. 107 (1982). Of course, an important distinction between these custody and support
cases and surrogacy arrangements is that the former deal with children who are already
alive and require financial and emotional sustenance, while the latter involve payments
to acquire a child for a potential family. Nonetheless, both kinds of transactions are
between blood relatives of the child and presumptively benefit the child by assuring him
or her enforceable support rights.
115. This is to be distinguished from having an embryo bank which would be run as
most sperm banks now operate: standard prices and some choice as to the characteristics
of a gene donor, but not a thoroughly competitive market for genetic materials.
116. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978). This is the most systematic and the most controversial defense in the current
literature of the argument for creation of a commercial market for babies.
117. Perhaps the most compelling critique of Landes & Posner is Prichard, A Market
for Babies?, 34 TORONTO L.J. 341 (1984). See also Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 687-88
(1979).
·
118. As part of its supervision of the process in which the surrogate releases her parental rights to the child's genetic father and the father's wife adopts the child, the state
could require an accounting of all expenses. While less intrusive than state-imposed price
ceilings, this procedure would permit the adoption court to review the expenses and disapprove excessive amounts, and would also serve to discourage those who offer surrogacy
services from charging whatever price desperate childless couples are willing to pay. See
infra text accompanying notes 169-80 for a discussion of other ways the state could protect the integrity of surrogacy arrangements.
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parties to any noncoital reproductive endeavor are fulfilled. The
operative presumption should be that private and public regulations will defer to and be consistent with the understandings
and expectations of the parties, except in those instances where
deference would cause specific and unacceptable harm to the
adults or to their offspring. 119 The existence of some risk of
harm should not provide a justification for preventing noncoital
reproduction from occurring, but rather should permit minimal
public intervention to reduce the risk of harm, while allowing
the basic understandings of the parties to go forward as planned.
The following discussion will focus primarily on what the law
can do to support and legitimate the private agreements and
medical procedures that work, those that are performed without
any of the participants becoming embroiled in conflict. It will
also consider why the law has been slow to resolve legal uncertainties for these "easy" cases, and what the law can do to promote the prompt resolution of the conflicts that erupt in "hard"
cases. 120 Because the legal uncertainties surrounding IVF, ET,
and traditional AID are somewhat different than those surrounding surrogacy, they will be discussed separately.
a. Of participants in IVF, ET, and AIDi. Establishing the legal status of offspring and parentsThe most pressing need with regard to IVF, ET, and AID is to
clarify the legal status of the offspring of these procedures and
of their intended parents. The allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities cannot be accomplished exclusively through private contracts. In the interests of assuring that children receive
a legal identity conducive to their development of a stable
psychosocial identity, the state must retain the final right to determine which individuals may be legal parents. No principled
reason appears for withholding the legal status of parents from
those adults who hope to raise the offspring of IVF, ET, and
AID. In view of the proliferation of different family forms in our
society in recent years, we should not allow the newness of IVF
and ET to obscure the fact that the biological and social aspects
119. I realize that any weighing of expectations against potential harms may involve
question begging; but as may become more clear in the discussion of how to minimize
harms to the offspring, those harms that can be specified and anticipated can also be
mitigated by a combination of public and private action. See infra text accompanying
notes 186-219. Although the expectations of the adults may have to yield to some regulation, there are to date no known harms so great as to justify the state in trying to prevent the basic fulfillment of these expectations.
120. At present, when disagreements arise, the intended parents may end up not with
a baby but with a lawyer. For the rueful comments of one such father, see A Surrogate
Mother's Story, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1983, at 76.
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of parenting are frequently separated. From the laws governing
adoption, paternity, custody, and even standard AID, we have
useful precedents to guide us in crafting a set of presumptions or
guidelines to govern the status of the parties to noncoital
reproduction.
Uncertainties about a child's legal identity are easiest to resolve in the typical IVF procedure, when the intended legal parents are the genetic father and the genetic and gestational
mother. Conception may take place in a petri dish, but the
child's genetic and cultural heritage remain, as it were, within
one family. The state needs no special procedures or presumptions to assign parental roles. Once third party sperm, egg, or
embryo donors become involved, however, it is no longer possible for the intended rearing parents to become the child's legal
parents without some special procedures or presumptions. About
half the states have enacted statutory presumptions to accord
with the parenting goals of couples who resort to traditional
AID. 121 These statutes conclusively presume that a man who
consents to the artificial insemination of his wife with semen
from an anonymous donor is the legal father of any child to
whom his wife subsequently gives birth. His wife is, of course,
the child's legal as well as biological mother. These laws absolve
the semen donor from any legal rights or obligations with regard
to the child. 122
When an unmarried woman has a child after artificial insemination with sperm from a licensed sperm bank, is the anonymous donor similarly exempted from any legal relationship to
the child? Although California exempts the donor whether the
mother is married or not, 123 most states leave this question unresolved. At least one commentator suggests that in order to assure "equal protection" to the child of an unmarried mother, the
child should be able to establish a legal relationship with the
sperm donor and even hold him liable for child support. 124 No
result would be more destructive of the reasonable expectations
of the adult parties to artificial insemination. 1211 If we assume
121. These statutes are listed in REP. HuM. REPROD. L. R-119 (1984).
122. Most of the statutes have provisions similar to § 5 of the Uniform Parentage
Act, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.] which exempts the donor from
any legal relationship to the child of a married woman.
123. CAL. C1v. CoDE § 7005(b) (West 1982).
124. Comment, Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children Conceived by Artificial
Insemination, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1061 (1984).
125. My intuitive sense that men would not donate sperm if they thought they might
someday be asked to assume financial or personal responsibility for the child produced
from their genetic contribution is bolstered by the findings of the Curie-Cohen survey,
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that the state, for practical or even for constitutional reasons,
cannot prevent unmarried women from seeking AID, 126 then the
state should not allow the legal status of the sperm donor to depend on the marital status of the recipient. The fact that the
offspring of unmarried AID mothers will not have a legal father
may be a reason for the state to abjure affirmative support for
the creation of such children. But, in my view, such a harm to
the children is not great enough to justify imposing parental responsibilities on the sperm donor, or attempts to prevent the
mother from bearing a child. 127
The presumptions designed for traditional AID of a married
woman are not appropriate when third parties contribute ova or
fertilized embryos, rather than semen, to the intended parent.
Embryo transfers, for example, are conceptually the reverse of
AID. The man who provides the sperm is likely to be the man
who wants to be the child's legal father. The woman who is artificially inseminated in order to subsequently permit her fertilized embryo to be transferred to the uterus of the sperm donor's
wife does not want a legal relationship to any resulting child.
For the first time, we face the question of who is the child's
mother-the woman who contributes her genes or the woman
who bears the child? The law should presumptively assign the
status of legal parents to the uterine mother and her husband, if
they are the intended rearing parents. The women who donate
eggs or embryos should have no legal relationship to the offspring generated from their genetic contributions; nor should
any other member of these women's families. Similar results
should obtain if an unmarried woman receives an embryo conceived from the egg and sperm of anonymous donors. The uterine mother should be the legal mother and, as with AID of an
unmarried woman, process integrity requires that the egg and
sperm donors be exempt from any legal relationship to the
child. 128
supra note 24, at 589.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
127. For a discussion of whether the state has any obligation to assist the offspring of
unmarried AID mothers to deal with the psychosocial consequences of not knowing their
genetic father, see infra text accompanying notes 212-15.
128. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos, 14 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Feb. 1984, at 50, 50-51. Although Annas argues that the gestational mother should
be the legal mother, he hedges in this article as well as in his other writings about how he
thinks the law should characterize the genetic father when the gestational mother is unmarried. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 30. Concerned more with the child's interest in
being able to claim financial support from a father than with the interest of the woman
in bearing a child after AID, Annas is reluctant to allow parental status to be consistent
with the expectations of sperm donors and unmarried gestational mothers. For what is in
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Clarifying the legal family relationships of the participants in
IVF and ET should present no great difficulties. 129 Why has no
state done so, and why have only half the states enacted statutes
to clarify the status of AID children? This unfortunate reluctance to publicly recognize or validate noncoital reproduction
adversely affects the interests of the offspring. Far from implicitly deferring to the contractual allocation of parental status, the
lack of statutory clarification frustrates the reasonable expectations of the parties. Adults and children alike are left in a legal
limbo, not knowing precisely who they are in relation to each
other. This leads to psychological complications that could be at
least mitigated, if not totally averted, by stamping statutory approval on the parenting goals of those who turn to noncoital reproduction to have a child.
ii. Establishing freedom from unnecessary physical or emotional complications- Although the state can and should clarify the legal status of the progeny of IVF, ET, or AID, the state
cannot guarantee couples that they will eventually have a child
to raise, nor that the child will meet any particular specifications. All pregnancies entail risks and those begun in a laboratory are no exception. Nonetheless, the childless do have reason
to expect that the reproductive process they choose, and for
which they are willing to pay a high financial price, will not generate so many physical or emotional problems along the way
that the hoped-for outcome of a child no longer seems worthwhile.130 Couples may, of course, act on their own in response to
difficulties that arise during the course of treatment. Women
and men can decide not to go ahead with an effort to implant a
fertilized egg, or can refuse to submit to physically invasive procedures. Until some point in their pregnancy, women can decide
to have an abortion, or to resist efforts to diagnose or treat fetal
abnormalities. 131
my view a much more compelling analysis of the importance of maintaining process integrity, see Blumberg, supra note 16.
129. For a discussion of the more difficult task of clarifying the legal relationship
between parent and child in the surrogacy context, see infra, text accompanying notes
145-79.
130. For an account of some recent research on how people respond to repeated failures to achieve pregnancy, see Brozan, The Grief of A Failed Pregnancy, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1983, at 85, col. 1.
131. Precisely how much freedom a woman continues to have with regard to her decision to abort or to resist fetal therapy remains a matter of considerable controversy. Two
of the most careful analyses of the conflicts between the interests of a woman and the
interests of her unborn child are Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 201 {1982)
and Robertson, supra note 41.
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These "self-help" measures are not sufficient, however, to protect the reasonable concerns about the medical procedures entailed in IVF or ET. At a minimum, the law should assure, as it
does with other medical services, that the medical experts upon
whom the childless rely as agents of their reproduction conform
to acceptable standards of professional behavior. Malpractice
claims, even though reactive rather than preventive measures,
are available for couples who believe they have been harmed by
negligent medical treatment. In fact, the background threat of a
malpractice suit may serve to prevent physicians from acting imprudently during the course of treatment. The law should also
see to it that the information disseminated about different techniques is not false or misleading. Many commentators believe
that the current lack of any public oversight of IVF and ET research or treatment outcomes is detrimental to the legitimate
interests of childless couples. 132 State or federal statutes could
require that prospective donors of genetic material be adequately screened so couples could protect themselves and their
offspring against physical or congenital problems. For the same
reasons that we do not want the state to decide who is eligible
for noncoital reproductive services, however, the state should
not give the childless any legal right to choose donors with specific traits. Such choices, if they are to be exercised at all, should
be made by couples and their physicians. As noted earlier, 133 the
federal government may already be involved, at least indirectly,
in supervising IVF or ET research because of the voluntary submission of research protocols to IRBs, which are then obligated
to protect the interests of any human subjects involved in the
procedures.
As with any complex and technically intricate course of medical treatment, however, a patient cannot reasonably expect to be
in control of the process. Couples who choose to exercise their
procreative autonomy through recourse to laboratory techniques
must rely on the expertise of those to whom they have turned. It
is a worthy goal to encourage medical professionals to give primacy to the interests of those they treat, and to encourage patients not to believe in the infallibility of "technological fixes." 134
But the law cannot insist that doctors be continuously accountable to patient demands for "autonomy," nor that doctors always provide unambiguous answers for those who prefer being
132. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 6.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
134. See, e.g., the warnings in this regard in Hubbard, supra note 131.
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more dependent on medical expertise than on their own sense of
how treatment should proceed. Tensions between doctors and
patients arise in the course of most complex or prolonged treatments, and IVF and ET procedures are not likely to be exceptions to this pattern. 1311
In sum, the law should not support the creation or attainment
of unreasonable expectations by childless couples for specific
outcomes from IVF, ET, or AID. But the law should be more
actively involved in facilitating the attainment of their reasonable procreative expectations.
b. Of parties to surrogacy contracts- Supporting the reasonable expectations of the participants in noncoital reproduction presents greater difficulties for surrogacy arrangements than
for IVF, ET, or AID. As illustrated by the experiences of the
biblical Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham, the interests of the uterine
hostess are potentially at odds with the interests of the intended
father and mother. If the contract is fully performed, the childless couple's interests are served by their receipt of a child to
raise and the gestator's interests are served by her receipt of the
payments agreed upon and, presumably, by the altruistic feelings she experiences upon delivering the child to the father and
his wife. What of the feelings of loss and sorrow that may temper the altruistic rush? Recent psychological studies have begun
to confirm what had been largely anecdotal evidence, that in
traditional adoptions, birth mothers who relinquish an "unwanted" child experience for many years thereafter a persistent
and profound sense of loss. 136 This sense of loss adversely affects
135. The dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship are themselves a fascinating
subject of study, but beyond the scope of this paper. I do think, however, that we should
be cautious before making assumptions that childless couples are eager to "manage"
their treatment or, alternatively, are likely to be very deferential to medical professionals. An excellent general overview of the conflicts endemic to the doctor-patient relationship is in E. ROBIN, MATTERS OF LIFE & DEATH: RISKS vs. BENEFITS OF MEDICAL CARE
(1984).
136. The first of these studies to attempt to explore the question of relinquishment
loss in any depth is ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, chs. 4 & 13. Deykin, Campbell &
Patti, The Postadoption Experience of Surrendering Parents, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH.
271 (1984) and Rynearson, Relinquishment and its Maternal Complications, 139 AM. J.
PsvcH. 338 (1982) both similarly report on the long term grief and sense of loss experienced by relinquishing birth mothers. The most ambitious study to date, but one which
may be of limited relevance to the arguably different social circumstances surrounding
adoptive placements in this country, is an account of the experience of Australian birth
mothers, R. WINKLER & M. VAN KEPPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS IN ADOPTION (1984).
All of these studies, however, as well as the few others they cite, are retrospective and
rely on volunteer samples, including women who respond to newspaper ads placed by the
researchers, or women who belong to organizations whose goals are to search for previously relinquished children, or who are psychiatric patients.
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their self-esteem and interferes with their capacity to sustain
satisfying relationships with men and, if they have any, with
their other children. 137 We do not know what will be the experience of surrogate gestators who deliberately bear a child for
others to raise. 138 Will the ostensibly different motivation for
producing and relinquishing a child protect them against or mitigate the dysfunctional effects of a long term sense of loss? 139
And what about the effect on the gestator's husband as he
watches her bear a child for another man? 140 And what about
her other children, 141 who may wonder whether they, too, will be
pawned off to another set of parents? Although the payments
are intended, in part, to compensate the surrogate for the emotional as well as the physical consequences of her pregnancy, she
may find that no matter how firm her resolve had been when she
originally agreed to be inseminated, she is reluctant to relinquish her baby at birth. 142
i. Specifying the interests of the parties- Can the principle
of supportive neutrality guide private intermediaries or state
137. These findings are reported in all the studies cited supra note 136, and especially in Deykin.
138. There is one published study of women who applied to be surrogate gestators,
Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCH. 1 (1983).
Some of these women indicated that they wanted to serve as surrogates in order to come
to terms with their own unresolved feelings of grief occasioned by an earlier relinquishment of a child for adoption.
139. WINKLER & VAN KEPPEL, supra note 136, at 61-69, report that it was not the
sense of loss by itself that adversely affected the birth mothers they studied, but the
perceived unavailability of a social support network. Those mothers who felt that they
had some genuine control over their decision to relinquish and who felt supported in that
decision by friends and relatives, both at the time of relinquishment and in subsequent
years, reported much less difficulty in dealing with their lingering sense of loss than did
those who felt pressured into giving up their babies.
140. Traditional AID also involves potential psychological complications for the birth
mother's husband, including the need to come to terms with his own sterility. But at
least the husband lives with his wife while she bears a child they both intend to raise.
141. Most of the lawyers who have arranged surrogacy contracts insist that the surrogate be married, have at least one child of her own, and profess a desire not to raise any
more children. See, e.g., KEANE & BREO, supra note 32.
142. There are several reported instances of surrogates who have refused to deliver
the baby to the genetic father and his wife. See, e.g., Thrane v. Noyes, 7 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2351 (Mar. 31, 1981) (permitting surrogate to retain custody of her child; denying
genetic father visitation rights but placing his name on the child's birth certificate). See
also the case of the British surrogate who had second thoughts about relinquishing the
baby to the American couple who had paid her to bear a child for them, supra note 13. I
know personally of one situation in which the surrogate and her husband already had
several children, all girls. When, pursuant to her contract with another man, the surrogate gave birth to a boy, her husband at first tried to prevent her from relinquishing the
boy to the genetic father, but later went along with her decision to abide by her contract.
The surrogate and her husband have since had another child of their own-another
daughter.
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courts and legislatures in efforts to protect the interests of all
parties to surrogacy agreements? There may be an unavoidable
tilt toward according greater protection to the interests of one
party rather than to those of another. Consider, for example,
what is at stake in a decision about whether the surrogate and
the intended parents ought to know each other's identity. Many
intermediaries who have negotiated surrogacy contracts believe
that fewer difficulties will arise during the course of performance
if all the parties meet and maintain contact with each other. The
parties allegedly come to appreciate each other's emotional
needs and become highly motivated to abide by the terms of
their contract. Some lawyers even recommend that the intended
parents be in the delivery room when the surrogate gives birth,
so that she can experience the joy of presenting the baby to
them. m But there is a contrary argument that anonymity is
preferable precisely because it prevents the surrogate from becoming aware of the emotions of the intended parents. Her anonymity, in this view, protects her from undue pressure to fulfill
her promise to relinquish the baby soon after giving birth. When
she does perform her part of the agreement, her decision to do
so will be genuinely voluntary. She will have no regrets and the
intended parents will get the child they crave.
This example suggests how difficult it is to determine which
approach is "neutral"-that is, supportive of the integrity of the
agreement without being unduly harmful to any of the parties.
The answer depends upon which interests the law considers
most essential to protect and upon what the law defines as
"harm" to those interests. If the primary concern is to assure the
outcome that the intended parents end up with a baby, then this
interest may be harmed unless the couple has some relationship
with the uterine hostess during her pregnancy. If the primary
concern is to preserve the integrity of the process by assuring
that the surrogate's consent to the original insemination and to
the subsequent relinquishment is voluntary, then this interest
may be harmed unless anonymity is maintained. Because, however, anonymity may in fact serve both the outcome interest and
the process interest, or may in fact serve neither interest, we are
unable to define it as a "harm" or as a "benefit." It is probably
best for the law not to formulate any presumption with regard
to anonymity, but to defer to the approach that makes the parties feel most comfortable. 144
143. Handel, supra note 22.
144. Research on surrogacy arrangements may eventually show that those in which
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ii. The indeterminacy of prevailing contract and family law
principles- An even more difficult test for the principle of supportive neutrality arises when the law must take sides, as, for
example, when the birth mother refuses to turn the child over to
the father and his wife. This situation does not involve a potential clash between an outcome concern and a process concern,
but a clash between two outcomes, one initially agreed upon and
the other developing as a consequence of the surrogate's experience bearing the child. Will the emotional harm now claimed by
the surrogate if she is required to relinquish the child be allowed
to vitiate the expectations of the intended parents? Since a decision either way will also determine who is to raise the child, how
are the child's interests to be weighed as against those of the
competing adults? Prevailing contract and family law principles
probably could not yield predictable results in the dual effort to
resolve the dispute between the adults and to protect the interests of the child. 145 As a consequence, time-consuming, expensive
litigation would be required to resolve the matter. All participants are thus harmed by the lack of an explicit principle of
support for noncoital reproduction.
Consider the numerous ways in which the intended parents'
breach of contract claim against the surrogate might be resolved.
The court might initially declare the contract unenforceable as a
violation of state laws against baby-selling. 146 In this event, the
infant would remain with the surrogate, but the genetic father
would be unable to sue for damages or other relief, and the participants in the surrogacy arrangement, including the lawyers,
might be subject to criminal penalties. 147 If the court did not
find the contract unenforceable, it might award the father and
the parties meet each other and have some kind of personal relationship are the ones
that have the fewest conflicts about outcome or process. Even then a state legislature
could justifiably be reluctant to make such contact mandatory. But it might be less hesitant to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the parties learning each other's identity. This discussion of anonymity between surrogates and intended parents is not conclusive for, and may not even be pertinent to, an analysis of the child's interest in
knowing the identity of her birth mother. For such an analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 218-19.
145. For the clearest analysis of how judges who decide child custody disputes must
perform the dual and often inconsistent functions of settling the private dispute between
the adult contestants and serving the societal interest in the welfare of the child, see
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
146. See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1183 (1983), where the Michigan Court of Appeals did declare the contract unenforceable as violating state law against baby-selling.
147. See supra note 9.
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his wife restitution of any sums already paid to the surrogate
and reimbursement of their reasonable reliance expenses. But
these would-be parents want their expectancy interest: specific
enforcement of the surrogate's promises to relinquish her parental rights to the father, and to consent to the child's adoption by
the father's wife. The court might decline this prayer for relief,
invoking the law's traditional reluctance to order specific enforcement of personal service contracts, and, instead, might permit the surrogate to retain the child, while ordering her to pay
damages to the couple to compensate for the loss of their expected child. The court might also relieve the father of any obligation to support the child, especially if the surrogate's husband
were willing to assume that obligation, or were deemed the
child's legal father by the statutory presumption designed for
AID children. 148 If the court felt that money could not adequately compensate the couple for the emotional damage occasioned by the loss of "their" child, 149 it could order the surrogate
to relinquish the child in exchange for the payments originally
promised her. 1110
Because the dispute involves the fate of a child who was not a
party to the contract, the court might find it inappropriate to
limit its decision to the issues posed by breach of a purely commercial transaction. Assessment of the claim for specific relief
would be tempered by the concern for the child's welfare. With
this in mind, the couple might recast their request in family law
terms, as a claim for the permanent custody of the child based
on the contractual agreement to give custody to the couple and
on the alleged best interests of the child (BIC). m Specific enforcement of custody agreements is not uncommon, but courts
subject the request to a review under the custody standards that
would operate in a particular jurisdiction in the absence of such
an agreement. 1112 It is also possible that the surrogate would con148. U.P.A., supra note 122, § 5.
149. Cf. the "unique goods" exception to the general principle of not awarding equitable relief for contract breach.
150. For alternative scenarios that might occur in the event of a dispute between the
surrogate and the intended parents, see Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous,
and Other Legal Strangers, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 383 (1984); Rushevsky, supra note 114;
Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1978). My own version is not
intended to consider all plausible possibilities, but merely to suggest how broad the
range of possibilities is, and how difficult it is to predict in advance how our hypothetical
dispute would be resolved.
151. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND D1voRcE ACT § 409, 9A U.L.A. 91, 211 (1979 and
Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as U.M.D.A.].
152. In many cases, such a review is pro forma, or the challenger bears a heavy burden of persuasion that such enforcement would be detrimental to the child. However, in
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vince the court that the critical issue is not enforcing the original contract, but dealing with her request for "modification"
based on the alleged "change of circumstances"-the profound
changes in her feelings about the child during the course of her
pregnancy. 153 Under either characterization of the issue-contract enforcement or modification-the court is likely
to apply some version of the typical BIC standard.
Under the BIC, neither the genetic mother nor the genetic father is obviously "best" as a potential nurturing parent. If the
court felt that the mother's "moral fitness" was tainted by her
refusal to perform the contract, 154 the BIC standard might help
the couple. Even then, the surrogate could respond by noting
first, that her conduct in commercial transactions is not relevant
to her fitness as a parent, and second, that she broke the contract for the sake of the infant, in order to assure the infant an
opportunity to be raised by a mother in whom the genetic, gestational and rearing roles were united. If the court applied a
tender years 155 or primary caretaker156 presumption, the surrogate would prevail. The surrogate might similarly have an edge
if the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit (GFS) standards were invoked,157 because her experience as child-bearer may establish
her as the only contestant with at least an incipient psychological parenting relationship with the child. If the mother continued to care for the child after birth during the pendency of the
dispute, her GFS-based argument would be stronger.
If the court looked for the parent more likely to encourage
"frequent and continuing contact" between the child and the
non-custodial parent, 158 neither one would be appropriate. If the
unusual circumstances like the ones presented by our hypothetical, the court is more
likely to perform an independent assessment under the jurisdiction's general custody
standards; see, e.g., Gruber v. Gruber, 87 A.D.2d 246, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1982) (ordering
a father to abide by an agreement to keep his children in a religious school through the
12th grade after he failed to show that following the "crystal clear" terms of the marital
separation agreement would be detrimental to his children).
153. This requires some stretching of the meaning of "modification," which usually
requires that there be a pre-existing custody decree; see, e.g., U.M.D.A., supra note 151,
§ 409.
154. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.23(3)(0 (1979).
155. See generally, Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
335 (1982).
156. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
157. GFS, supra note 55, at 97-101.
158. For example, California is one of a growing number of states to give preference
to the so-called "friendlier parent," the one more likely to allow the maintenance of a
continuing relationship with the non-custodial parent, in the event that the primary statutory preference for joint custody cannot be applied. CAL. Civ. CooE § 4600(b) (Deering
1983). I have not even considered the possibility of using the fashionable preference for
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court were required to give weight to the commitment of the
parties to parenting, 1119 the father's prospective loss of his opportunity to raise his child might weigh heavily against the court's
reluctance to award custody of a newborn to anyone other than
the birth mother. Similarly, if the court viewed the father's wife
as sharing his strong reliance interest in parenting, then it might
conclude that fairness dictated an award of custody to the father
and his wife, even though the wife would normally not be able to
prevail in a dispute against a biological parent. 160 In sum, even
though in a number of jurisdictions the financial or custodial
provisions of the contract might be presumptively valid, the
court might or might not conclude, after reviewing the evidence,
that the child's interests would be threatened by specific enforcement. 161 And if the court had initially determined that the
surrogacy contract was unenforceable, the custody dispute would
be resolved with even less attention to the parties' original
expectations.
Regardless of how the custody determination turned out, the
court would still have to decide whether to enforce the surrogate's promise to consent to the child's adoption by the father's
wife. Here, the solicitude that courts and legislatures have
shown to the right of birth mothers to withhold or revoke their
consent to adoption 162 would have to be balanced against the
joint custody, since our hypothetical is clearly not conducive to the harmonious sharing
of custodial responsibilities. One of the best analyses, to date, of joint legal and physical
custody is Scott & Derdyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 455 (1984).
159. Under current family law principles, courts are typically not required to do this,
although many judges implicitly take the interests of the adults into account in applying
a BIC standard. For an interesting argument that courts should take into account the
interests and expectations of the adults, see Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive
Rules for Child Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
160. This is because of the typical statutory requirement that in a dispute between a
parent and a third party, the BIC of the child is served by awarding custody to the
parent, "unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence," MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 722.25.5 (1979); or unless the third party can show that an award to the
parent "would be detrimental" to the child and an award to the third party is "required"
to serve the BIC, CAL. C1v. CooE § 4600(c) (Deering 1983).
161. If the court decided that the couple should get custody, it would probably characterize the decision as a "custody award" and not as "specific relief," in order to avoid
the appearance-symbolically-of ordering the surrogate to perform an objectionable
personal act. Whatever the terminology, the result would in fact be that the father and
his wife would end up with the child.
162. See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321
N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971), in which a birth mother who claimed that she was
pressured into consenting to her daughter's adoption was allowed to revoke her consent
even though the child had already been placed with prospective adoptive parents. The
birth mother did not regain her child, however, because the adoptive parents fled to
Florida where a local court later denied the birth mother's request for habeas corpus.
Foster, Adoption and Child Custody, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1972). See also, Sims v.

908

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:4

claims of the father and his wife that the child's best interests
necessitated enforcement of the gestator's promise. 163 Because
consent was given even before the child was conceived, 164 and
because the birth mother probably would revoke it while the infant remained in her possession, 165 the court would have to be
very strongly committed to serving the parenting interests of the
prospective adoptive mother before it would seriously entertain
her request for specific enforcement of the adoption promise.
If the adoption does not take place, the genetic father and his
wife could end up with custody of the child, but subject to visitation by the surrogate gestator. If the surrogate prevailed on
the custody dispute, she could end up with custody of the child,
but subject to visitation by the genetic father and his wife. Conflicts over child support would persist. The arrangement would
take on the characteristics of many of the blended families that
now come into existence when divorced parents, who share legal
and physical custody of their child, each remarry. The child's
stepparents, who may in fact give the child both emotional and
financial sustenance, acquire at most an ambiguous legal relationship to the child. 166 Parents who choose to divorce have considerable control over the consequences of that decision for their
children as well as for themselves. This is because the law, albeit
indeterminate on many issues if the parties disagree, generally
Sims, 30 Ill. App. 3d 406, 332 N.E.2d 36 (1975). The range of different statutory consent
provisions is summarized in MEEZAN, supra note 9, at 154-64. Most states impose some
kind of time limit within which a revocation must be made. Id.
163. A handful of states have incorporated the BIC question into their consent to
adoption statutes. This includes New York where, subsequent to Scarpetta v. SpenceChapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971), the legislature enacted a provision which in some circumstances makes it easier for prospective
adoptive parents to invoke the BIC standard to enforce a birth mother's consent to relinquish her child. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(d)(ii),(iii),(iv). For a persuasive criticism
of this statutory change as being insufficiently protective of the interests of birth
mothers in traditional adoptions, see Note, The Constitutional Rights of Natural Parents Under New York's Adoption Statutes, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 617 (198384). Although a number of states seem to have case law precedents for refusing to allow
birth mothers to revoke adoption consents, the variation in the standards is so great that
I find it impossible to extrapolate a general rule.
164. Many statutes provide that a consent to adoption signed before birth cannot
become irrevocable until some time after the child is actually born or, alternatively, that
no matter when a consent is given, it can be withdrawn at any time prior to placement
with the adoptive parents or prior to the entry of the adoption decree. See MEEZAN,
supra note 9, at 154-64.
165. This, of course, makes it difficult for the prospective adoptive mother to argue
that she rather than the birth mother has established an emotional bond with the infant.
166. See generally, Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent·
Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38 (1984).
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supports and enforces their private agreements. 167 Parties who
choose to enter surrogacy agreements have considerably less
control over the consequences of their decision. The law is not
only indeterminate when a dispute arises, as we have just
seen, 168 it is also indeterminate when the parties agree. Surely
the law owes at least as much protection to the private understandings of those who hope to create families as to those who
are breaking them apart. Unguided by an explicit principle of
support for this kind of procreative choice, courts and legislatures are preventing childless couples from making reasonable
plans for child rearing, and subjecting children to persistently
unresolved questions about who is responsible for raising them.
m. Justifying a presumption for enforcing surrogacy contracts- To avoid these harms, contract and family law principles should be combined into a strong statutory presumption in
favor of enforcing the terms of the private surrogacy contract,
including the provisions governing the relinquishment of the
child to the father and the consent to the adoption of the child
by the father's wife. Any party who challenged the agreement
should have to show by clear and convincing evidence either
that the agreement was not freely and knowingly entered into, 169
or that full and specific enforcement would be detrimental to the
child. The presumption would thus favor the intended parents'
interests in the event of a breach by the surrogate, and the surrogate's interests in the event of a breach by the genetic father.
A strong presumption in favor of enforcement is warranted for
a number of reasons. First, because there is no way to anticipate
whether a child will be better off being raised by his birth
mother and her husband or by his genetic father and his wife,
the child is not harmed by a presumptive allocation to the father
in accord with the basic intention of the surrogacy contract. Second, placing a burden on those who would challenge the enforcement of rights and responsibilities allocated voluntarily, rather
than on those who desire such enforcement, conforms with our
general social, if not full constitutional, support for privately de167. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 11; Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015 {1985).
168. Our discussion of what might occur if the law has to take sides when a surrogate
decides that she does not want to relinquish the child suggests only a few of the legal
uncertainties surrounding these reproductive choices. Many others would become manifest if we were to explore the consequences of a genetic father's breach of the contract
terms, by refusing, for example, to accept the child or by refusing to make the promised
payments.
169. This would serve the process concern of protecting the surrogate against undue
pressure to enter the agreement in the first instance.
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termined reproductive choices. Third, this presumption would
make it considerably easier than it now is for the parties to a
surrogacy arrangement that goes smoothly to obtain legal and
public validation of their private conduct. Those who understand what they are doing, and do it without harming either
each other or their offspring, should not have to go to court to
fight for a sympathetic interpretation of their activities. Fourth,
the existence of this presumption would encourage people to reflect carefully upon the consequences of a surrogacy contract
before entering into one, and discourage them from initiating litigation to set aside such agreements once performance has begun. Given the special importance of avoiding the harms to children occasioned by protracted custody litigation,1 70 there is
much to be said for a presumption designed to narrow the
boundaries within which legal indeterminacy exists. For the sake
of the child who is bound to be harmed by not having a clear
location in which to experience her infancy, we should not wait
for the majesty of the law to gradually and inconsistently manifest itself through a series of ad hoc decisions. Legislative action
is needed now. 171
Legislation designed to presume and facilitate enforcement of
surrogacy contracts must, of course, ensure that both the negotiation and the performance of the contract conform to at least
minimal standards of fairness. The state should require, for example, that the agreement be in writing, that the surrogate and
the intended parents offer evidence of the knowing and voluntary nature of their consent, such as being represented by separate counsel, 172 and that any party be permitted to cancel the
agreement without penalty prior to the insemination of the
surrogate.
The state should also insist that specific terms be included to
enhance the possibility that the parties will end up with the outcome they desire. Contracts routinely should provide for medical
and genetic screening of the surrogate and the intended father
to protect the surrogate against infections transmitted by the father's sperm and the child against inheritable illnesses or other
congenital disabilities. The surrogate should agree to abide by
explicit instructions from her physician to refrain from regular
170. GFS, supra note 55, ch.3.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29 for the similar argument for clarifying the legal relationship among the parties to IVF, ET, and traditional AID.
172. See, e.g., the recommendation of the Committee on Judicial Ethics of the New
York City Bar Association with regard to separate attorneys for the surrogate and the
couple, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4069 (1982).
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sexual intercourse while trying to achieve a pregnancy through
artificial insemination. Contracts also should call for blood tests
to determine paternity after the surroga.te gives birth. 173 Escrow
accounts or insurance policies 174 are needed to guarantee that
the promised payments are made, including, for example, partial
payment to the surrogate if she miscarries or if other unanticipated medical complications prevent her from carrying the baby
to term.1 711
Additional legislation may be needed to facilitate, first, the acknowledgment of the genetic father's paternity, second, the relinquishment of the surrogate's parental rights to the genetic father, and third, the adoption of the child by the father's wife.
Some might argue that the surrogate's relinquishing of parental
rights to the child's father is the equivalent of her consent to the
child's adoption by another woman. I think the integrity of the
entire process is better served by separating the relinquishing of
parental rights, which might be interpreted in some jurisdictions
as not being broad enough to encompass a general consent to
adoption, from the surrogate's consent to the specific adoption
by the father's wife. Alternatively, this could be accomplished in
one judicial proceeding in which the surrogate submitted her
written consent relinquishing all parental rights to the father,
including the right to place the child for adoption. 176 At this pro173. As many commentators have noted, such requirements could have averted the
Malahoff-Stiver fiasco in which the fate of the microcephalic child borne by the surrogate remained uncertain because of a dispute-over his genetic parentage. Blood test results, read on the Donahue show, eventually indicated that the child was the son of the
surrogate and her own husband. See, Annas & Elias, supra note 70, at 217.
174. The parties will probably agree to have such accounts or policies in order to
support the child in the event that the father dies or refuses to accept custody. But since
the state does not require that the children generated by coital means be similarly protected in the event one or both parents die or abandon them, I do not believe such a
requirement can be mandated in the surrogacy context.
175. She should not get paid, however, if she decides to have an abortion, unless she
does so with the consent of the genetic father after learning, for example, from amniocentesis, that the fetus is not developing normally. She should also not get paid if her
own negligence results in the loss of the fetus. Frankly, I am undecided as to whether the
state should by statute limit the father's recovery against the surrogate to return of his
payments, in the event that her provable neligence results either in the loss of or physical harm to the baby. Perhaps this question, as well as the question of specific enforcement of any promises made by the surrogate with regard to prenatal care, ought to be
resolved by the courts in what I hope will be very few such cases.
176. I am not addressing here the possibility that the father's wife will refuse to
adopt the child, or that the father will refuse to give his consent to the adoption because,
for example, he and his wife are estranged. Would the surrogate be held to her relinquishment of parental rights to the father even if the adoption does not take place? I
would stand by my proposed presumption of enforceability of the promise to relinquish,
in part because it is by no means clear that the child would be harmed if raised exclusively by his or her father.
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ceeding, the court could scrutinize the consent to be sure it conformed to the proposed standard of being informed and voluntary, 177 and could ask for an accounting of all moneys paid to the
surrogate and to the attorneys.
Legislation should recognize the legitimacy of the payments
discussed earlier, 178 and should specifically exempt the kind of
surrogacy agreement described here from state statutes prohibiting "baby-selling." As a final protection of the integrity of the
process, the state could insist on a minimal social investigation
of the adoptive mother, analogous to what might be done in a
routine stepparent adoption. 179 The scope of this inquiry should
be carefully limited to any characteristics that might threaten
the child's welfare, and should not include any futile attempt to
determine if the adoptive mother is the "best" possible parent
for the child. Indeed, counseling services for the father and the
adoptive mother, to assist them with any problems they anticipate in raising the child, would be more consistent with the procedures outlined here than would any general investigation of
the suitability of either one of them as parents. But I doubt that
any state would be willing to allow its courts to approve the
adoption without some inquiry into the setting in which the
child will probably be raised. At the end of this process, the surrogate gestator would have no legal rights or responsibilities to
the child, who· would then reside with her legal parents-her genetic father and his wife.
My aim, in outlining some of these procedural and legislative
measures, has been to show that my proposed presumption in
favor of enforcing surrogacy contracts can be achieved without
creating an elaborate administrative or supervisory structure. I
explicitly disagree, for example, with Walter Wadlington's suggestion that the model of traditional adoption with its "networks
of child placement agencies operated or regulated by the
states," 180 is an appropriate model for supervising surrogacy contracts. As my proposals indicate, I do recognize that some public
oversight is necessary. But the goal of any public regulation
must always be to protect the interests of all parties by allowing,
177. If the parties had previously determined that they wished to retain anonymity
among themselves, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text, this desire could be
honored by having the court question the birth mother separately, or by waiving any
requirement that she appear in person.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
179. The interest in protecting the child's welfare does not, in my view, require an
elaborate investigation of the intended parents any earlier in the process. For my skepticism about screening for parental fitness, see supra text accompanying notes 98-106.
180. Wadlington, supra note 23, at 512.
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to the greatest extent possible, the parties to define those interests for themselves.
The social and psychological complexities of surrogacy, 181 in
addition to its legal ambiguities and commercial aspects, may
present good reasons for people not to choose this procreative
option. These concerns.certainly account for the hostility toward
surrogacy expressed by the medical profession and by most associations of adoption and child welfare agencies. 182 The current
efforts in Britain and Australia to criminalize commercial surrogacy are similarly responsive to these concerns. 183 Surrogacy is
also distasteful to those feminists who are eager to eliminate the
perception and use of women exclusively as child bearers. Those
sharing this perspective see the childless man exercising a form
of "patriarchal genetics" over the woman whose gestational services he hires, 184 as well as over his wife, who, if the typical pattern holds, is more likely than he to assume the major responsibility for the infant's care. For other feminists, however, who
glorify the role of woman as child bearer and nurturer, 185 surrogacy may be the apotheosis of the ethos of care among women.
My own position on surrogacy is, as suggested throughout this
discussion, that it is extemely difficult to make an informed and
knowing decision to pursue a procreative choice that has so
many indeterminate psychological consequences. Nonetheless, in
the absence of a showing of specific and substantial harm to the
offspring, I do not believe the law should stand in the way of
those who determine that this is the most appropriate choice for
them.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 136-44.
182. See, e.g., the critical statement of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) (May 1983), reprinted in 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31 (1983). See
also the AMA Resolution criticizing surrogacy arrangements as not serving societal interests, reported in REP. HuM. REPROD. L. R-114 (1984); and the recommendation by the
Child Welfare League of America and the National Committee for Adoption (NCFA)
that adoption agencies refuse to cooperate with any surrogacy arrangements and that
legislation be enacted to outlaw these arrangements, reported in Pierce, supra note 66, at
3002.
183. WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, §§ 8.17-8.18: "That people should treat others as
a means to their own ends, however desirable the consequences, must always be liable to
moral objections. . . . [T)here is a serious risk of commercial exploitation of surrogacy
. . . that ... would be difficult to prevent without the assistance of the criminal Jaw."
See also WALLER REP., supra note 14, part 4.
184. See, e.g., Blakely, Surrogate Mothers: For Whom Are they Working, Ms., Mar.
1983, at 18.
185. From his interviews of women who wished to be surrogates, Parker, supra note
138, reported that many of these women experienced a strong emotional desire to bestow
"the gift of life" on childless women.
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Minimizing Harm, Especially to the Children

What about the children who are the end product of the new
conception techniques? To remain consistent with the principle
of supportive neutrality, the state's policies for facilitating procreative choice must yield at some point to the newborn's interest in avoiding harm. 186 In defining the parameters of the child's
interest, three questions need to be addressed. Should special
attention be afforded the products of assisted fertilization? Can
the kinds of harms that might befall these children be anticipated? What might be done to minimize the likelihood that
these harms will occur?
No one stands at the bedside of the couple who are attempting to conceive a child through coital means to ask whether they
have taken appropriate steps to protect their offspring against
physical or emotional harms. Why should the children produced
by noncoital means receive special treatment? With other children, we defer to parental autonomy until some actual danger
looms against which the parents are by themselves unable to
shield their children, or for which the parents themselves are responsible. Why should it be different here? The grounds for
some early "protection" are clear. As discussed earlier, the absence of some state action identifying the legal parents may
leave children vulnerable to harm resulting from being the object of litigation, as well as from the lack of stability that inheres
in not knowing precisely who one's parents are. 187 The very process by which these children are created may be more physically
harmful or dangerous than conventional conception and birth.
Finally, the specific psychosocial harms that may reasonably be
anticipated to threaten these children over the course of their
lives might actually be averted or mitigated by supplementing
the self-interested actions of the adult participants in noncoital
reproduction with some publicly-imposed preventive measures.
1. Threats to physical well-being- Is there any evidence
that the new reproductive techniques jeopardize the physical
well-being of the offspring? The artificial in vivo insemination of
a surrogate gestator with the sperm of the intended father
presents no more chance that the child will be born with physical or congenital disabilities than what would be anticipated
from the usual process of conception and gestation. 188 The
186.
187.
188.

See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
See supra ·text accompanying notes 121-29 and 145-68.
Artificial insemination is a simple procedure, requiring no surgery and no medi-
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chances may even be lower because the medical and genetic histories of both the sperm-provider and the uterine hostess would
presumably be thoroughly reviewed and "approved" before the
artificial insemination takes place. 189 Also, the promise of payment upon her delivery of a newborn may encourage the surrogate to give the child especially attentive prenatal care.
In contrast to the surrogacy situation, the risks of physical
harm to a child from being fertilized in a petri dish may be
somewhat higher, or at least of a different kind. Although many
medical groups are convinced that IVF is safe, 100 questions remain about the unknown and still unknowable long term consequences of being conceived outside a womb. Biomedical research
has taught us a great deal about the growth and development of
embryos. Nonetheless, we still lack complete understanding of
this extraordinarily complex process. Similarly, our knowledge of
what accounts for the successful implantation of a fertilized embryo within a woman's uterus remains incomplete. Many interrelated processes occur at the same time. If anything goes awry,
the consequences could occur at once and the embryo could
abort itself, as indeed happens in many "natural" conceptions.
But the difficulties could also appear years later in unexpected
and catastrophic ways. 191
There is a somewhat greater than average likelihood of multiple births after IVF, along with their predictable concomitants:
premature labor, low birth weights, and caesarean delivery. This
is not due to the in .vitro fertilization itself, but to the currently
cation, that can be performed in a doctor's office or in an outpatient hospital clinic,
FINEGOLD, supra note 23. We are assuming that the AID of surrogates will be performed
by licensed physicians and not, as of course can be done, by the parties themselves.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33 for the suggestion that the state require the routine use of the most up-to-date diagnostic and genetic screening tests for
the surrogate and the genetic father prior to the insemination. This is not intended to
prevent the surrogacy agreement from going forward if the tests indicated some heightened degree of risk to the child, but to make the information available to inform
whatever decisions the adults make. For example, if the tests reveal that the child is
likely to have cystic fibrosis, the state cannot prevent the adults from proceeding as
planned, but they themselves might decide not to proceed.
190. AFS Statement, supra note 91. Much of the information, as well as the questions raised, in this and the following paragraph are drawn from recent articles in FERTILITY & STERILITY or J.A.M.A., from IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER,
supra note 91, and from my discussions with members of the Stanford Medical School
faculty.
191. Much of this would also apply to donor embryo transfer. Although fertilization
in the ET procedure takes place in vivo, our knowledge about the consequences of transferring an embryo from one reproductive environment to another is still derived largely
from cattle and other aninmal breeding. Brotman, supra note 29; Buster interview,
supra note 29.
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preferred procedures of giving the uterine mother superovulation drugs prior to retrieving her eggs, and then implanting several fertilized embryos simultaneously to improve the chances of
at least one successful implantation. No one has suggested that a
high occurrence of multiple births is an unacceptable "harm";
indeed, some would say it is a benefit both to the parents who
get an unbargained-for windfall and to the children who get siblings they might not otherwise have. Similarly, no one has
claimed that any of the children born thus far as a consequence
of IVF show signs of unusual physical or mental disabilities.
Nonetheless, the oldest of the test tube babies is only seven-andone-half-years-old. How long should we wait before we can feel
comfortable about saying that the risks to children from IVF are
no more or less than the risks from normal conception? 192
More importantly, how substantial would the risks from IVF
have to be before we would feel comfortable arguing for its prohibition? And who are "we": prospective parents choosing between having no child and having a child who, however "damaged," is genetically related to at least one of us; doctors
deciding whether it is worth our time to attempt to improve IVF
outcomes or to explore other infertility treatments; or the federal or state governments choosing between commitment to procreative autonomy for adults and responsibility to protect the
welfare of children? In other words, "we" might include everyone except the child, who is not in existence and therefore cannot tell us whether he or she would prefer some life to no life at
all. The law must of necessity entrust the fate of the unborn
child to others. Perhaps equally inescapable is the difficulty of
preventing the interests of adults from always getting primacy
over the interests of children.
2. Threats to psychological well-being- This last observation may be of even greater relevance for an analysis of potential
psychosocial harms to the children produced by noncoital means
192. Our experience with other medical procedures or treatments that have resulted
in unanticipated and severe physical harm certainly argues for some caution when the
creation of human life is involved. Consider such examples as the doubling of the incidence of uterine cancer in the 1970's, which has now been attributed to the widespread
use in the previous decade of estrogen therapy for post-menopausal women; the inaccurate diagnoses of pulmonary embolism resulting from the use of inadequately tested lung
scanners; past epidemics of blindness among premature newborns resulting from excessively high exposure to oxygen while in neonatal intensive care units; the second
thoughts now beginning to emerge about the superiority of radical mastectomy for
women with breast cancer as opposed to the less physically invasive and disfiguring approach of limited lumpectomy. These and other examples of medical practices which
became routine without adequate studies to test their efficacy and safety are discussed in
E. ROBIN, supra note 135, at ch. 8.

SUMMER

1985]

From Coitus to Commerce

917

than for a discussion of physical harms. Consider what would
happen if IVF or ET offspring were suddenly to manifest serious
physical problems; being born, for example, with some fatal disease. This would probably not result in a clash between childless
couples and a paternalistic legislature or court. Instead, all parties would quickly come to a consensus to abandon these
procedures. 193
In contrast, conflicts between the interests of children and the
interests of adults might well arise once attention shifts to the
much more elusive realm of psychosocial harms. The state may
then have to be enlisted to act on behalf of the children. Although more difficult to specify than physical harms,
psychosocial harms are no less real. Those harms most likely to
threaten the offspring of noncoital reproduction resemble the
genealogical bewilderment that many adopted children experience: confusion about the circumstances of their birth, difficulties with identity formation, and desires to be reconnected to
their apparently lost genetic heritage. 194 It is not abnormal to be
curious about one's origins; indeed, such curiosity is generally
recognized as a healthy and predictable part of growing up. In
recent years, adoptees who seek information about their biological parents have been treated more sympathetically; they are no
longer seen as obsessive or weird. 195 Erikson and Lifton are
among those who argue that identity formation does require
some awareness of one's biological and historical past. 196
a. Whether to reveal the child's origins- Secrecy has been
193. I doubt whether even those who believe that it is better to be born with handicaps than not to be born at all would argue that it is better to be born in order to die an
early and painful death than not to be born at all, especially if other less dangerous
routes to conception could be devised. But for an argument that comes close to the position that any life, no matter what its quality, is better than no life at all, see Robertson,
In Vitro Conception and Harm to the Unborn, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1979, at
13.
194. For a general overview of the psychological problems adopted children confront,
see American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Adoptions, Identity Development in
Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948 (1971); Schwam & Tuskan, The Adopted Child, in
1 BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 342 (J. Noshpitz ed. 1979). For useful bibliographies of the many published and unpublished papers on this subject see AooPrION TRIANGLE, supra note 99; W. FEIGELMAN & A SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN (1983)[hereinafter cited as CHOSEN CHILDREN].
195. The research on searching and on reunions between adoptees and birth parents
reported in ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, has had a lot to do with changing attitudes toward adoptees who manifest curiosity about their biological roots. See also CHO•
SEN CHILDREN, supra note 194, at ch. 8; JONES, THE SEALED AooPrION RECORD CONTRO·
VERSY: A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINIONS (1976).
196. E. ERIKSON, LIFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORICAL MOMENT (1975); R. LIFTON, THE
LIFE OF THE SELF: TOWARD NEW PSYCHOLOGY (1976).
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an element in adoption since the 1920's, 197 but it need not be
carried over into other child rearing arrangements that involve a
separation of biological from social parenting. Even in the case
of adoption, informed opinion during the last several decades
has overwhelmingly favored sharing with the child the· fact that
he or she has been adopted. 198 The offspring of noncoital reproduction ought to be told the circumstances of their birth. Even if
the parents do not display a bronzed petri dish on their mantle,
it is difficult to imagine that the circumstances of artificial conception could be kept from a child forever. Children are bound
to experience more distress if they learn about these circumstances inadvertently than if their parents tell them. Adoptees
who feel the greatest need to search for their biological parents,
and who often experience other kinds of psychological stress, are
those who learn of their status when they are older or who are
told, not by their adoptive parents, but by others. 199 Nothing is
gained by non-disclosure. The energies that go into maintaining
the "family secret" undermine the long term development of a
trusting relationship between the child and the parents who
raise her. 200 There are reasons to believe, then, that similar distress and intra-family difficulties will afflict the offspring of IVF,
ET, AID, and surrogacy if they are kept in the dark about the
nature of their conception.
Assuming that it is better to tell than not to tell, can disclo197. E.g., New York State explicitly recognized in 1924 that the judge who granted
an adoption had the discretionary power to seal the records of an adoption proceeding.
1924 New York Laws ch. 323, § 113. But New York, like most other states, did not
mandate the sealing of adoption records until at least the mid-1930's. See 1935 New
York Laws ch. 860, § 113. See generally Hollinger, The Search for the Ideal Home:
Adoption in America, 1900-1935 (paper prepared for University of Wisconsin Legal History Project, summer 1984; copy on file with the U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
198. CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 194; CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE § 4.20 (rev. ed 1978) [hereinafter cited as CWLA STANDARDS). See also Dukette, Value Issues in Present-Day Adoption, 63 CHILD WELFARE
233 (1984).
199. See generally ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, and CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra
note 194.
200. Sands & Rothenberg, Adoption in 1976: Unresolved Problems, Unrealized
Goals, New Perspectives (paper read at American Association of Psychiatric Services for
Children, Annual Meeting, San Francisco, (1976)). This influential paper is the work of
two psychiatrists who earlier had the view that no harm would come from keeping the
fact of a child's adoption secret. See ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, ch. 3. I can find
nothing in the child development literature of the past decade arguing that any good can
come from failing to disclose to a child the circumstances of her birth, except for an
article by one psychoanalyst. On the basis of limited clinical experience, Wieder conjectures that for some adoptees, the psychological disturbances that result from knowing
that they were adopted may prove too difficult to handle; see Wieder, On Being Told of
Adoption, 46 PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY 1 (1977).
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sure be "enforced" and its character prescribed? Surely not.
Deference to parental autonomy and faith in parental good
sense remain preferable to having the state send children a certificate of IVF conception on their eighteenth birthdays. Doctors
could make a promise to disclose a condition of the parents' receiving IVF treatment, but would there be a follow-up? And
what sanctions could be imposed for failing to disclose? The
child's "right" to know is strong, but not so strong as to circumvent the decision of the child's parents about when and how to
disclose. 201
b. Whether to reveal non-identifying information- What
about information concerning the medical and genetic make-up
of those who contributed to the children's conception? The offspring deserve, as do the adults who raise them, all the available
information. 202 This should include not only the information
about the donor of sperm, egg, embryo, or baby at the time of
conception, but also up-dated accounts throughout the donor's
life. The parents are themselves likely to encourage their child's
genealogical curiosity. After all, it was their own desire to be genetically linked to their offspring that led to their efforts to conceive through some combination of their own and third party
genetic materials. But as the experience over the past several
decades with AID reveals, the relevant information is all too
rarely available. Without a state-imposed requirement that genetic and medical profiles of sperm, egg, embryo, and baby donors be made initially, and then periodically up-dated and made
available to the legal parents or to the children upon attaining
age eighteen, such procedures may never become routine. 203 In
201. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 198, suggest that counseling services be provided
for parents of adoptive children who desire assistance in planning how to tell their chil, dren about the circumstances of their birth and adoption. Such counseling might also be
a useful adjunct to IVF, ET, and surrogacy services, but the state should not get into the
business of monitoring the intimate details of the parent-child relationship.
202. My reading of the "search for roots" literature on adoptees, including ADOPTION
TRIANGLE, supra note 99, CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 99, and many of the articles they
cite, suggests that the genealogical bewilderment discussed here may be eased for many
children by simply sharing with them whatever is known about their biological parents,
short of identifiying information. It is not so much a question of whether the adoptees
would like more than non-identifying information, but whether any psychological stress
they experience as a consequence of not having identifying information can be at least
partially reduced by the disclosure of non-identifying information.
·
203. Curie-Cohen, supra note 24. This study of AID procedures revealed a shocking
lack of attention to pre-insemination screening as well as to maintaining up-dated information about sperm donors. The AID experience, then, is far from encouraging about the
ability of the private market to see to it that such records are maintained. Even among
the 25 states that have AID legislation, few require recordkeeping. As a consequence, the
choice has been made for an entire generation of AID children: no information about
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addition to the parents' and children's legitimate interest in
having access to non-identifying medical and genetic information, society also has a general interest in monitoring the incidence of heritable and genetic diseases and conditions. The
medical professionals who are now devising standard protocols
for IVF and ET acknowledge the importance of acquiring and
maintaining complete background information about donors. 20"
A statutory requirement should bolster this resolve. As an innocent participant in her own conception, the child should not be
burdened in the future by the discovery that her perfectly legitimate curiosity about the characteristics of her biological forebears cannot be satisfied because records of those characteristics
were not maintained.
Providing non-identifying information, the wisdom of which is
at last becoming self-evident, does not resolve the more controversial question of whether to divulge the identity of a third
party donor. Parents may be quite willing to have the donor's
genetic profile and medical history known to their child, yet prefer that the donor's identity remain undisclosed. The parents'
feelings may depend on whether they themselves know the donor's identity. These feelings may also depend on whether they
fear that providing such knowledge to their child would threaten
their own relationship with him or her. Our recent experience
with the open-records debate in the context of traditional adoption shows how difficult is the question of whether to disclose ·
the identity of third parties to the child's conception. 20 ~ It may
be possible, however, to approach an answer if we begin with the
simpler of the noncoital situations-IVF, ET, and AID-and
subsequently move to the more complicated circumstances of
surrogacy.
c. Whether to reveal the identity of IVF, ET, and AID donors- Until the child is eighteen, the decision concerning the
identity of the IVF, ET, or AID donor should be left to the
child's parents. But once the child is herself an adult, the interests of her legal parents should no longer be able to stand in the
way of her learning what is known about the genetic and meditheir genetic fathers.
204. Buster interview, supra note 29, Lamb discussions, supra note 25, AFS STATEMENT, supra note 91. For similar recommendations in the context of traditional adoptions, see CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 198, at 4.26.
205. See generally ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, and CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra
note 194. In my view, because of the limited and self-selected nature of the research
samples, none of the studies is as conclusive about the psychological benefits of disclosure as many of the researchers would like us to believe.
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cal histories of those who contributed to her conception. Nor
should her parents' wishes stand in the way of her learning the
identity of those contributors if she desires to do so. Even as an
adult, however, she may encounter other legitimate barriers to
her desire to obtain identifying information. The most formidable of these are the past assurances given to sperm, egg, embryo,
or baby donors that their anonymity would be preserved. The
donor's reliance interest in continued anonymity cannot be
brushed aside easily. But it can be reassessed through some kind
of registry process 206 in which donors are contacted by neutral
intermediaries on behalf of the IVF, ET, or surrogate gestator's
adult child, and asked if they would object to the disclosure of
their identity. 207
As a matter of general policy, is it advisable to establish a presumption that the identity of the donor shall eventually be made
known to the child? The answer determines whether doctors
performing IVF, ET, or AID should seek donors who are willing
to have their identities disclosed. If the law tilts toward the view
that the child has an absolute "existential right" to such disclosure, or even that the child has some legitimate interest in such
disclosure, then doctors should indeed seek donors who will not
ask for anonymity. If, however, the law's preferred policy is assuring the continued availability of noncoital reproduction-a
circumstance that might become less likely if promises of nondisclosure were no longer offered-then the law ought to move
cautiously in deciding to discontinue any guarantee of anonymity. Sperm donors are not routinely asked if they want such a
guarantee. They are invariably given one on the assumption that
they would demand one if asked. 208 We have had too little experience with egg donors to predict their feelings about anonymity.209 As I argued above, it is advisable to assure donors that
they will never have any financial or legal liability for a child
produced from their eggs or sperm. 210 But the prohibition of lia206. See supra note 62. Upon attaining her majority, the child may communicate
with the surrogate gestator or egg, embryo, or sperm donor and ask if the donor is willing
to change his or her original desire for anonymity.
207. Although, as the above discussion indicates, we are beginning to get studies of
the effects of non-disclosure on adoptees, no one has studied the psychological effects of
being told "no" in response to a request for identifying information made 18 years or
more after the child's birth.
208. Curie-Cohen, supra note 24.
209. Dr. Buster does have anecdotal evidence that some potential donors said they
would prefer not to have their identities disclosed, but others said they would be curious
about any child produced from their genetic contribution and assumed that such child
would be curious about them. Buster interview, supra note 29.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 121-28.
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bility differs from the assurance of anonymity.
Because our thinking about the disclosure of the donor's identity has been so bound up with ideas about the disclosure of the
identity of the biological parents of adopted children, it is essential to attend to a basic difference between the two kinds of nonrearing parents. The difference gains importance in the present
context because it strengthens the argument for a presumption
against disclosure of the identity of sperm, egg, or embryo donors. 211 The donor assists in a planned, much-desired pregnancy;
he or she is not shedding an unwanted child. Thus, the child
conceived in part with the assistance of a donor's genetic material can be told that she was very much desired by all parties to
her conception. She was not an "accident" or a "mistake." The
donor stands in a very different relation to the child than does
the biological parent to the adoptive child: the donor's contribution is impersonal, indeed mechanical. Donors facilitate the gestational, birthing, and rearing experiences of others. The donor
is less akin to a biological parent in an adoptive relationship
than to a contributor of blood to a needed and wanted transfusion. Hence the donor does not present, for the child, the potential problems presented for an adopted child by having an unknown, biological parent.
Nonetheless, recent research has begun to raise some basic
questions about the appropriateness of assuring sperm, egg, or
embryo donors that their identities will remain confidential.
Nearly all of a large group of sperm donors interviewed ten to
twenty-five years after their donations212 indicate that they are
curious about their genetic offspring, have felt some regret about
their earlier requests for anonymity, and are concerned about
the possibility that the children may experience psychological
distress as a consequence of being unable to have any contact
with their genetic father's families. 213 The parents who raise AID
211. For an argument in favor of the reverse presumption when full surrogate gestation is involved, see infra text accompanying notes 218-19.
212. The questionnaires were administered by Pannor and Baran, two of the authors
of ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99. Their research will be reported in a forthcoming
book by Pannor and Baran, both psychiatric social workers affiliated with Vista Del Mar
Child Care Services in Los Angeles, California. The information presented here is based
on a telephone interview with Mr. Pannor, Apr. 9, 1985 [hereinafter cited as Pannor
interview].
213. Pannor interview, supra note 212. Some anecdotal support for the Pannor and
Baran research appeared in a television interview of male sperm donors whose sperm has
been used to inseminate unmarried women at an Oakland, California sperm bank. These
men spoke of their own surprise at discovering, years after their donation, that they were
persistently troubled by a desire to know more about the children they helped produce,
Newscenter 4, (K.R.O.N. T.V., NBC Network Affiliate), San Francisco, California, Apr.
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children report considerable tension within their families, especially in the event of a divorce, over the issue of discussing with
their child the nature of his or her conception. The offspring,
most of whom are eighteen and older, report strong desires to
know the identity of their genetic fathers. These children are not
impressed by the argument set forth above, 214 that the special
circumstances under which the sperm was contributed result in
their experiencing less urgency to know their actual genetic father. These AID children believe that their relationships with
the parents who raised them would be considerably improved if
they were able to learn the identity of the sperm donors.
But are these findings, based on a limited number of AID donors and offspring, sufficient to overcome the arguments for preserving the anonymity of sperm and egg donors? Probably not.
The evidence from traditional adoptions is mixed; it is far from
clear that psychological distress always follows from lack of
knowledge about the identity of a biological parent; 2111 nor is it
clear that the only or best way to relieve that distress is by divulging the parent's identity. It may be that disclosing the identity of the birth parents-the proposed "cure"-creates additional problems for the children, in relating to both their
adoptive and biological families, that will prove just as intractable as the initial psychological distress of not knowing who the
birth parents are. 216 Perhaps counseling or other efforts directed
at alleviating the children's felt distress, or at enabling adoptive
parents to understand and respond to the concerns of their children, would be of equal or greater value. The limited research to
date on the children of divorced parents offers even less direct
support for a presumption favoring disclosure. The finding that
the children of divorce do better psychologically when they
2, 1985.
214. Pannor interview, supra note 212. These children are, of course, not the only
children whose fathers are perpetually "absent" or unknown. It will take some time
before the significance of any other research on the psychological role played in a child's
life by unknown fathers is assessed in relation to the findings of Pannor and Baran.
215. See, e.g., the strong dissent from the argument of AnoPTION TRIANGLE, supra
note 99, in Aumend & Barrett, Self-Concept and Attitudes Toward Adoption: A Comparison of Searching and Nonsearching Adult Adoptees, 63 CHILD WELFARE 251 (1984).
Although working with a small sample, these researchers find that the desire for knowledge of birth parents is not especially widespread and that the effects on self-esteem and
identity conflicts among those adoptees who learn the identity of birth parents is not
substantial; cf. CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 194, at 224, whose authors found widespread genealogical curiosity but much less prevalent searching behavior than they had
anticipated.
216. See, e.g., the note of caution in Dukette, supra note 198.
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maintain contact with both parents 217 appears superficially consistent with an argument that knowledge of genetic parentage is
essential for children. But the post-divorce research explores the
arguments for continuing an established and existing personal
relationship, one that may not always have been happy, but one
that has involved continuous emotional interaction. These research results may not be pertinent to the question of whether
to facilitate the creation of a personal relationship when the only
prior link between a donor and the offspring was an impersonal,
genetic one.
The AID, adoption, and post-divorce research does not present a compelling argument for disclosure; nor does it present a
compelling case for anonymity. I would err on the side of facilitating the possibility of disclosure in the event that the felt need
for such information does in fact become more widespread, and
in the event that future research substantiates the still tentative
claim that disclosure makes a positive difference for AID, IVF,
or ET children. At the very least, the states should create a registry procedure to preserve the opportunity of the child, once he
or she reaches the age of eighteen, to initiate an inquiry. At this
point the issue is between the gene donor and the offspring, not
between the intended parenting couple and the child.
d. Whether to reveal the identity of surrogate gestators- I
have been addressing the problem of disclosure as it applies to
IVF, ET, and AID; it takes on a different texture in the context
of full surrogacy. The genetic and gestational mother has had a
relationship with the child that the donor of eggs, sperm, or fertilized embryos has not had. Instead of an exclusively genetic
connection, hers has included sustaining the unborn fetus within
her uterine environment for nine months 218 and may also have
included some time caring for the child after birth. The years
the child will spend with her rearing parents are of much more
importance to the child's overall social and psychological development than these nine months, but we should not therefore
deny the importance to the child of having access not merely to
information about, but to the actual identity of, her birth
mother. Traditional arguments developed in the standard adop217. See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980); Hetherington, Cox & Cox, The Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES 233 (M, Lamb ed. 1982).
218. For a discussion of the possibility of emotional bonding between a mother and
an infant during the course of pregnancy itself, see KLAUS & KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT
BONDING: THE IMPACT OF EARLY SEPARATION OR Loss ON FAMILY DEVELOPMENT 45-46
(1976).
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tion context for protecting the anonymity of the birth mother do
not apply: the birth mother does not need anonymity to protect
her against the shame or embarrassment of an unwanted pregnancy. The surrogate deliberately chooses to become pregnant
and to bear a child for others. She is likely to be proud of what
she has done. Even if she later has regrets, her stake in confidentiality is not sufficient to outweigh what may be the importance
to the child's psychological well-being of learning her identity.
This is especially so if the birth mother receives no assurance of
permanent anonymity in the first place and therefore, in contrast to birth mothers in traditional adoptions, has no reliance
interest to protect. Nor is anonymity needed to protect the child
against the stigma of illegitimacy. If the contract is performed,
the child will not be illegitimate and will suffer no legal or social
stigmas as a consequence of the circumstances of her birth. The
one traditional argument for anonymity that continues to have
some viability in the context of surrogacy is the need to protect
the autonomy of the legal parents to raise the child as they pre~
fer without any interference by the birth mother. This interest
can be served by insuring that the legal parents retain the right
to decide whether to divulge the identity of the surrogate to the
child until the child becomes an adult and can decide for herself
whether or not to seek this information.
Should the decision about whether and when to disclose the
identity of the birth mother to the child be left exclusively to
the terms of the private agreement between the surrogate gestator and the child's intended parents? Not altogether. If the
parties agree to disclosure, their agreement should be enforced.
If they attempt instead to grant permanent anonymity to the
surrogate, they ought to be told that such a guarantee cannot be
made. As with sperm, egg, or embryo donors, states should establish a registry procedure to enable the question of disclosure
to be raised between the child and the birth mother at some
later point in the child's life. 219
I have been arguing that the potential psychological harm to
children resulting from not having complete information about
those who contributed to their creation warrants specific legal
procedures to facilitate access to such information. But I remain
unpersuaded by arguments for mandatory disclosures of the
219. My intuitive sense is that the number of women willing to serve as surrogates
would not decrease if potential surrogates were told that even if they preferred anonymity, the state might determine that the welfare of the child required leaving open the
possibility of disclosing their identity at some future date.
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identities of surrogate gestators or the donors of genetic material. Consider how many children raised by their genetic parents
may not be told every detail of their parents' background. Parents may choose to omit some information about their own lives
or about the lives of close relatives. Most people grow up with
knowledge about themselves and their families that is incomplete or distorted. No public authority exists ready to disseminate to the child-turned-adult his or her own Book of Genealogy. The alleged severity and persistence of psychological
distress and of intra-family conflicts resulting from such incomplete knowledge remains elusive and speculative, despite the research findings discussed above. I believe, however, that the history of traditional adoptions teaches us that we should not
attempt to irrevocably impose secrecy, and that the psychological, social, and financial advantages to children of being reared
by adoptive parents can be attained without inflexible policies
on confidentiality. As we attempt to shape the law to provide for
the welfare of the offspring of noncoital reproduction, we should
at least preserve, rather than foreclose, options. Although the
jury will of necessity be out for an indefinite time on the question of potential harm to the offspring, we do not have to be
paralyzed, unable to take steps to minimize or avoid the harms
that might occur. The state should act even though we may
never know in our own lifetimes whether these alleged harms
would in fact have occurred if we had not acted to forestall
them. The state should make available to the offspring of IVF,
ET, AID, or surrogacy certain procedures whereby they may
learn no less than the rest of us ever learn about our forebears.
But there should be no obligation to see to it that they learn
more.
3. A different kind of harm to children- The offspring of
noncoital reproduction are not the only children who are placed
at risk by the striving of men and women for procreative autonomy. There remains an altogether different category of potential
harm: the risk of indifference to the many thousands of children,
indeed, to the hundreds of thousands, 220 who are already born
but in desperate need of parents to raise them. Those who pursue IVF, ET, AID, or surrogacy do so in part because of the belief that they have no reasonable alternatives for obtaining a
220. The Children's Defense Fund estimated in 1978 that 500,000 American children,
many of them infants but most of them pre-adolescents and adolescents, were without
permanent homes and were being raised in foster homes or in some kind of institutional
setting. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 1-2 (1978).
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child; that, for example, there are not enough infants available
for adoption. 221 While it is certainly true that most adoption
agencies do not have healthy white infants222 to offer to the
childless, 223 it is not true that a supply of adoptable children is
generally lacking. Aside from older children with mental or
physical handicaps, who indeed may pose special problems for
prospective parents, many thousands of healthy white and nonwhite American as well as foreign-born chidren remain, who
would probably do quite well even if raised by parents of a different racial or ethnic background. 224 Many more women and
adolescents than is commonly supposed, who give birth out of
wedlock, would consider relinquishing their children for adoption if they were treated in a more humane and sensitive manner
than has been characteristic of many adoption agencies in the
past. 2211 These mothers want to be reimbursed for their pregnancy-related expenses and they want to have some role in the
221. The only published survey, to date, of the characteristics and attitudes of
couples applying for IVF treatment indicates that more than two-thirds of the 200
couples interviewed were positive or neutral toward adoption. About one-third would
continue to consider adoption or fostering if their IVF efforts were unsuccessful. Freeman, Boxer, Rickels, Tureck & Mastroianni, Psychological Evaluation and Support in a
Program of in Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 48
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Freeman] (describing a study of 200 couples applying for IVF
treatment at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital between Jan. 1983 and Mar. 1984).
Anecdotal evidence from couples pursuing surrogacy also suggests that many of these
couples would have adopted an infant if one had been available. See, e.g., KEANE &
BREO, supra note 32, at ch. 1.
222. Nearly all the couples seeking IVF or ET are white. Freeman, supra note 222
(96'.',, of couples applying to University of Pennsylvania IVF Clinic are white); Lamb
discussions, supra note 25; Buster interview, supra note 29.
223. In the 1970's, agency placements fell from about 70,000 per year to less than
25,000. Wadlington, supra note 23, at 467. National data on adoptive placements has not
been available since 1971. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 198, at 6. No one doubts, however, that adoption agencies have been placing very few newborns and that the average
wait for an adoptable infant from an agency is 5 to 7 years. Interview with David Keene
Leavitt, member Adoption Committee, A.B.A. Family Law Section, and Adoption Committee of California State Bar, Apr. 11, 1985 [hereinafter cited as Leavitt interview].
224. CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 194, at 4-6, for an account of the special difficulties, and distinctive successes, of transracial and transcultural adoptions. Additional substantiation of the claim that "whatever problems may be generated by transracial adoption, the benefits to the child outweigh the costs," is reported in the follow-up study to
CHOSEN CHILDREN, Feigelman & Silverman, The Long-Term Effects of Transracial
Adoption, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 588, 600-01 (1984); this article contains a useful bibliography, at 601-02, for exploring some of the controversial aspects of transracial adoptions.
The National Association of Black Social Workers remains opposed to transracial adoption, as do other black professional organizations, on the ground that "Black children in
white families are cut off from a healthy development of themselves as Black people,"
quoted in R.J. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 45 (1977).
225. MEEZAN, supra note 9, at 228-32; Charney, supra note 99; Leavitt interview,
supra note 223.
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selection of the adoptive parents for their child.
In addition to the many adults eager for children to raise,
there are, then, many children who need parents. What we lack
is a sustained public commitment to bringing the two together.
The state's interest in assuring all children an opportunity to
have parents, which I have argued deserves more fundamental
protection than the interests of adults in procreating, 226 calls for
more legislative and financial efforts to avoid the harms noted
here. 227 Without such a commitment, the worlds of adoption and
of noncoital reproduction will grow farther and farther apart,
and those who resort to the laboratory to conceive a child will be
symbolically, if not actually, diminishing the role of adoption in
our society.
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH AND
SERVICES

In exploring this new chapter in the striving of women and
men for full procreative autonomy, 228 I have shown how modern
medical technology has created choices where previously none
had existed, and have argued that actors in the new reproductive drama deserve from the law certain supports that are now
insufficiently in place. I have sought to specify these supports,
and to distinguish what they can and cannot reasonably be expected to achieve on behalf of the various parties affected by
noncoital reproduction. It remains to underscore the extent to
which this historic drama is being played out on a stage
designed and managed by professionals whose relation to the
public interest constitutes an enduring controversy in our society. If Jehovah sought to manage, in a fashion, the drama centering around Ishmael, today's Ishmaels and Hagars, and Sarahs
and Abrahams, must rely instead on doctors and lawyers responsive both to the dynamics of their own professions and to the
competitive and commercial aspects of the private market for
226. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60 and 80-83.
227. Adoption or "permanency planning" is, of course, not the only, and not always
the best response to the plight of homeless children. In my view, efforts should first be
directed at sustaining a viable existence for the child within the context of his or her
biological family. See generally K. KENISTON, ALL Ou& CHILDREN ch. 9 (1977); Davis,
supra note 98; Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423 (1983).
Nonetheless, the contemporary focus on the rights of birth parents and on the potential
of IVF, ET, or surrogacy for obtaining biologically-related offspring may serve to obscure
the benefits of adoption for both children and adults.
228. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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baby-making. 229
This reliance calls for further scrutiny and reflection in at
least two areas. The first involves the circumstances surrounding
research on the efficacy, safety, and long term psychosocial and
physical consequences of noncoital repro,duction. The second involves the competence and accountability of those who provide
IVF, ET, or surrogacy services. A basic question must be raised
about both areas: to what extent can the law encourage greater
responsiveness by the private providers to the interests of the
childless and their hoped-for offspring? All I can do here is to
indicate why this question is so difficult to answer.
In marked contrast to the substantial federal funding for most
other biomedical research in this country, funds for basic and
applied research in noncoital reproduction still derive entirely
from private sources. 230 In addition to relatively small sums from
nonprofit medical centers and foundations, support comes from
venture capital companies 231 and perhaps even from a portion of
the fees paid by childless patients. 232 Privately funded research
may yield useful practical results, but it is scarcely reasonable to
expect research carried out under the auspices of profit-conscious venture capitalists to be directed toward reducing patient
fees or toward advancing our understanding of underlying physiological and genetic processes. If the moratorium on federal
229. Perhaps the most comprehensive history and analysis of the emergence of a corporate ethos in the medical profession is in P. STARR, THE Soc1AL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). No comparable contemporary analysis exists for the legal
profession, although Willard Hurst's work still provides a fascinating introduction to this
subject, W. Hurst, The Bar, in THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950); there is at least
one excellent recent case study, in J.P. HEINZ & E.O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).
230. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also, Pear, Grants for Medical
Research to be Cut by Administration, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985 at Al, col. 2. NIH
funds may be used to support research on some of the psychosocial consequences of
noncoital reproduction. See, e.g., the results of an NIH-funded project reported in McGuire & Alexander, supra note 94. But because of the moratorium in effect since the late
1970's on federal funding of IVF and ET, NIH funds are not available for basic research
on the efficacy or safety of IVF and ET techniques or for studying externally fertilized
embryos for information about the structure of genes, the development of malignancies,
the "natural" loss of embryos, etc.
231. For example, the work on donor embryo transfers by Dr. John Buster and other
researchers at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center was funded by a $500,000 grant from Fertility & Genetics Research, Inc., a Chicago-based venture capital firm, supra notes 29-30
and accompanying text. Medical research and health care are among the "new hot spots
for venture capital investing," according to Eckhouse, Plight of Venture Capitalists, S.F.
Chronicle, Feb. 1, 1985, at 33.
232. I have not found any direct evidence that patient fees are being used to subsidize research on IVF or ET procedures, but the suggestion that they are is not implausible. See Abramowitz, supra note 6, at 9.
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funding were lifted, the prospects might improve for creating
both a more broadly defined agenda for research and a more
neutral and comprehensive system for evaluating and disseminating its results. 233 The introduction of federal guidelines might
inspire greater confidence among the childless when certain procedures are designated as "acceptable treatments" and others as
"merely experimental." It might also assure that participants in
genuine research projects were neither paid to "volunteer" nor
expected to pay for any services rendered to them. 234
It would be naive to expect, however, that any transition to
increased public support for research would guarantee that commercial principles would give way to those of "disinterested" scientific inquiry. Federal funding or monitoring would no doubt
be accompanied by political, ethical, and cultural conflicts about
the appropriateness of specific research endeavors. Approval for
research proposals would be sought amid public debates about
the definition of "life," the consequences of experimentation on
human embryos, the use of donated genetic materials, the disposition of unused embryos, and the appropriateness of allowing
unmarried persons to be among the potential beneficiaries of
noncoital reproduction. Moreover, a shift to federal funding
would raise the question of research priorities. Is noncoital reproduction so important a need in our society that federal funds
should be allocated to its development rather than, for example,
to research on the causes of infertility, or on how to prevent the
ravages of sexually transmitted diseases, 235 or on how to reduce
the infant mortality rate? 236 Finally, regardless of what combination of private and public funds eventually prevails,237 the find233. These points were among those made before Representative Albert Gore's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology,
United States House of Representatives, Aug. 8, 1984, cited in Annas, Redefining
Parenthood and Protecting Embryos, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 5, 1984, at 50.
234. For a discussion of federal requirements that human subjects in federally sponsored research projects not be offered any "undue" inducements to participate, see
Schwartz, Institutional Review of Medical Research, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 143, 148 (1983).
235. See, e.g., the pleas of Leon.Kass that federal funds should be spent on preventive measures rather than on what he characterizes as "our thoughtless preference for
expensive, high-technology, therapy-oriented approaches to disease and dysfunctions."
Kass, supra note 5, at 54; a similar plea is made, albeit from a more avowedly feminist
perspective, in Hubbard, supra note 131.
236. Recent data indicate not only a nationwide slowing of the rate of decline in infant mortality, but also an ominous increase in some states in the mortality rate of babies after the newborn stage. Pear, "Cause for Concern" on Infant Mortality Seen by
U.S. Agency, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1985, at Al.
237. Any discussion of funding sources for research on noncoital reproduction must
take account of the more general contemporary debate about the goals and methods of
research in biotechnology. A useful introduction to this debate is the editorial, How
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ings of research on noncoital reproduction are likely to be less
definitive than its proponents desire 238 and to require interpretation within a matrix of conflicting personal and social values.
As for the competence and accountability of those offering
noncoital reproductive services to the childless, the medical and
legal professionals have a number of incentives to regulate themselves. Among these are concerns about malpractice liability, eagerness to match, and indeed to surpass, the achievements of
rival professional communities in Britain and Australia, and
competition among medical schools to offer specialized training
in reproductive endocrinology. 2311 Lawyers who are intermediaries in surrogacy arrangements are sensitive about the
relatively low prestige of family law practice 240 and want to insulate themselves against allegations of "baby-selling."20 Further,
many doctors and lawyers are genuinely committed to assuring
safe, efficient, and humane service to their patients and clients.
Responding to these incentives, medical groups have begun to
devise standard protocols for IVF and ET clinicians. 242 There
are also indications that the psychological aspects of infertility
treatments are not being ignored. 243
Nevertheless, wherever profit motives and professional rivalries are strong, we have reason to look for ways in which the law
can supplement efforts at self-regulation. Because the capital investment needed to equip an IVF, ET, or AID-surrogate gestator
clinic is very low (compared, for example, to the costs of equipment for performing heart transplants), it is easy to enter the
business of selling noncoital reproductive services. The public
interest in assuring the competence of the purveyors of these
Much Research Is Enough?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at A14, col. 1, and one of the
many responding letters to the editor, Cape & Perpich, How We Can Stay Ahead in
Biotechnology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at A26, col. 3.
238. For an interesting general discussion of why "[d]iscovering what works and what
does not is something the medical professional is not very good at," see Bunker, When
Doctors Disagree, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 25, 1985, at 7.
239. These concerns were frequently expressed in the Lamb discussions, supra note
25, and in the Buster interview, supra note 29. They are also manifest in the professional
medical journals cited throughout this article.
240. One of the best contemporary analyses of how family law practitioners are regarded by other lawyers, as well as by their clients and the general public, is in HEINZ &
LAUMANN, supra note 229, at Part III.
241. See generally Handel, supra note 22; Keane & Breo, supra note 32; Sherwyn,
supra note 87.
242. See, e.g., AFS Statement, supra note 91, and the influential article, Dandekar &
Quigley, Laboratory Set Up for Human in Vitro Fertilization, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1 (1984).
243. See, e.g., Mahlstadt, The Psychosocial Component of Infertility, 43 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 335 (1985); Freeman, supra note 221.
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services might, therefore, be well-served by the imposition of
some statutory licensing requirements. 244 But the government
should not indirectly support the creation of private monopoly
control over entry into the market by granting patent protection
to specific noncoital reproductive techniques. 245 Beyond that, it
is easier to identify the appropriate limits to federal regulation
than it is to outline a program for exactly how a combination of
private and public regulation can best guarantee services of the
highest possible quality. And the law can probably do even less
to ensure that the childless actually exercise their procreative
choices to achieve their own goals-not the goals of the doctors
and lawyers upon whom they must depend. 246
In our search for ways to reap the benefits and to resolve the
problems raised by the new reproductive technologies, a certain
skepticism about "hypergenetic" activity is in order. We would
do well to remember the power of society and culture to transfer
and to transform what we are from one generation to the next.
Control of our genes does not, after all, provide us with very
much control over the kinds of people who will carry these
genes. Genes are of course relevant, but we achieve our most intimate and abiding identities as the children of the parents who
raise us. As we enlist the support of the law in behalf of procreative autonomy, we should not forget that the reproduction of self
that so many hope to achieve through their children is more evident in the long term relationships of rearing and nurturance
than in the single act of genetic procreation.

244. I have in mind something similar to the statutory licensing authority recommended in Britain by the WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 14. Unlike the Warnock recommendation, however, such licensing would not be denied to those offering surrogacy
services.
245. A sharp controversy has erupted within the medical profession about the propriety of the application of Fertility & Genetics Research, Inc., supra note 231, for patent
protection for the donor embryo transfer procedure developed by Dr. Buster and his
colleagues with investment funds from Fertility & Genetics Research, Inc. Although patent protection for drugs and medical devices is commonplace, such protection for a medical process is virtually unprecedented and, if enforceable, would enable the patent
holder to exercise considerable control over who could or could not perform the protected medical procudures. See Annas, supra note 30, and Chapman, supra note 90.
246. An excellent analysis of how authoritarian patterns of interaction continue to
define most doctor-patient relationships can be found in J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).

